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Abstract
Women empowerment has for long been part of all development
agendas as part of the developing economies' social and economic reform plans.
However, statistics do not usually reflect much improvement in the status of
women’s empowerment, especially under austerity. And while most research
focuses on the agony and vulnerability of poorer women, a big gap emerges
with regard to middle classes women, who try hard to maintain the status of
their households and not fall into poverty.
This research attempts to cover part of this gap by investigating the
social and economic empowerment of urban middle classes Egyptian women
post-2016 IMF loan and related austerity measures. The research follows a
qualitative approach of ten in-depth interviews with women from different
spectrums within the middle classes. It concludes that while participants
practiced and enjoyed much empowerment financially, they were not equally
empowered socially. And this empowerment can be compromised in some
instances due to the unchanged position of women within the governing social
norms.

III

Table of Contents

Dedication ..................................................................................................................... I
Acknowledgment ......................................................................................................... II
Abstract....................................................................................................................... III
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................. 1
Research Question .................................................................................................. 5
Hypothesis................................................................................................................ 5
Research Objectives ................................................................................................ 6
Potential Contribution of Research ....................................................................... 6
Chapter 2: Methodology and Conceptualization ..................................................... 9
Collecting Data ........................................................................................................ 9
Population .............................................................................................................. 10
Identifying Middle Classes ................................................................................... 10
Assessing Empowerment ...................................................................................... 12
Sampling ................................................................................................................ 14
Interview design .................................................................................................... 15
Data Analysis ......................................................................................................... 15
Limitations............................................................................................................. 17
The Research Process ........................................................................................... 18
Challenges through the process ....................................................................... 19
Chapter 3: Literature Review .................................................................................. 22
Empowerment and Austerity ............................................................................... 22
Why does empowerment matter? ........................................................................ 25
Defining Empowerment ....................................................................................... 27
Women’s Empowerment and Social Classes ...................................................... 30
Theories on Middle Classes .................................................................................. 33
Defining Middle Classes ....................................................................................... 37
Chapter 4: The Egyptian Middle Classes ............................................................... 44
Nasser’s Middle Class ........................................................................................... 45
Sadat’s Open-door Policy ..................................................................................... 49
IV

Mubarak Era ......................................................................................................... 52
Lifestyle and Moral Traits ................................................................................... 55
Women of the Middle Classes .............................................................................. 58
Chapter 5: Economic Empowerment and Social Disempowerment .................... 63
Economic Empowerment ..................................................................................... 63
Vulnerable empowerment ................................................................................ 64
Decision-making Dynamics .............................................................................. 65
Economic Insecurity ......................................................................................... 67
Self-development ............................................................................................... 69
Social Privileges and Burdens .......................................................................... 70
Social Empowerment ............................................................................................ 73
Social Norms and Judgments........................................................................... 74
Mobility and Public Space................................................................................ 76
Added Worker Effect ....................................................................................... 77
Female-headed VS Co-headed households ......................................................... 78
Perception of Empowerment ............................................................................... 80
Unintended Results ............................................................................................... 83
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 87
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 89
Appendix .................................................................................................................... 95
Appendix I: About the Participants .................................................................... 95
Appendix II: Interview Questions ....................................................................... 99
Appendix III: Coding Sheets.............................................................................. 101

V

Chapter 1: Introduction
In 2016, the Egyptian government launched a series of economic
measures dubbed economic reform policies. These policies aim at introducing
reforms to restore confidence in the economy, encourage investments, and –
most importantly – secure International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) approval for a
12-billion-dollar loan, which was successfully concluded in November 2016.
This research investigates the effect of these economic policies on the economic
and social empowerment of urban middle classes Egyptian women.
The immediate financial measures included introducing a value-added
tax at the rate of 13 percent to replace the general sales tax at the rate of 10
percent (Reuters, 2016), the floatation of the Egyptian pound, which resulted in
the depreciation of the local currency by almost 50 percent overnight (The
Guardian, 2016), lifting fuel subsidies by 30 to 47 percent in 2016 and many
phases later until it became in line with its real cost in July 2019 (Reuters, 2019)
and increasing customs duties for hundreds of imported goods that were labeled
“luxurious” or “non-essential.” Besides, further IMF reviews and measures
were imposed throughout a three-year reform plan.
This new scheme resulted in a tremendous increase in prices of almost
all services and commodities, which burdens the lower and middle classes. It
affected the purchasing power of the people, sales in various industries, and the
capacity to consume. Consequently, questions are constantly raised about how
Egyptians shall maintain their livelihood amid the changes brought about by
austerity.
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Inflation rates skyrocketed as a result of the newly introduced measures.
Fuel, and consequently transportation, costs kept increasing as the government
gradually lifted fuel subsidies till it was lifted entirely in July 2019. According
to IMF Data Mapper, inflation rates were in constant decline between 2009 (at
16.2 percent) and 2013 (at 6.9 percent). Inflation started to rise again after
imposing the IMF measures, reaching 10.2 in 2016, then hit a hike of 23.5
percent in 2017, the highest recorded inflation rate in Egypt since 1987, when
the inflation rate reached 25.2 percent (IMF Data Mapper). Although inflation
rates have been declining since 2018 (20.9 percent in 2018 and 13.9 percent in
2019), accompanied by a slight decline in food prices, austerity has taken its toll
on the living standards of the majority of the Egyptians (Bloomberg, 2019).
The outcome of these measures on the livelihood of households was not
favorable. The drastic situation was clearer almost three years after bringing
austerity into effect; in July 2019, CAPMAS stated that the poverty rate
increased in Egypt to 32.5 percent in 2017-2018, compared to 27.8 percent in
July 2016. It also noted that the poverty line’s income increased from 482
LE/month/person in 2015 to 736 LE/month/person in 2017/2018. The Egyptian
Minister of Planning attributed such an increase to the social burden brought
about by the economic reforms in Egypt.
The economic change brought about family structure and dynamics
changes and placed a bigger financial burden on women, who generally have
less access to jobs and income-generating activities. According to CAPMAS,
divorce rates have been a constant increase since 2016, with 192.1 thousand
cases in that year, compared to 211.6 thousand divorce cases in 2018, then
reaching the highest number recorded ever of 225.9 thousand cases in 2019
2

(CAPMAS, 2020). Also, State Information Service stated in 2017 that 12
million Egyptian females are the main providers for their households. However,
women’s share in the job market remains at the low of a quarter of the
workforce, according to the data published in the National Strategy for the
Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030, released by the National Council for
Women in 2017. Therefore, among the goals of the Strategy is to reduce the
unemployment rate among women from 24 percent to 16 percent, especially
since 26.3 percent of Egyptian female breadwinners were below the poverty line
when the strategy was published. Moreover, in the event of having fewer job
opportunities in the market, 82 percent of Egyptians believe that men should be
prioritized, a culture that the Strategy targets in the long run. According to the
International Labor Organization (ILO) data, Egypt comes among the countries
with the least share of women in the workforce, where the current global labor
force participation rate for women is close to 49%. 1
More recent data from the Human Development Report on Egypt state
that women’s share of the Gross National Income (GNI) remains way below
men’s. In 2017, female GNI in Egypt was 4836 dollars compared to 16637 for
males, 4573 for females versus 17449 for males in 2018, and 4753 for females
compared to 18039 for males in 2019. The report also reveals that 27 percent
only of Egyptian women have access to the services of the financial institutions
or mobile money service providers (Human Development Report on Egypt).

Women’s share in the labor market is generally small in the Middle East, yet it exceeds 60%
in countries like Sweden, Norway, and Canada. In the global south, women’s share exceeds
70% in countries like Congo, Angola, Ghana, and Guinea.

1
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Moreover, women do not have sufficient qualifications to compete in
the job market. Only 59.2 percent of Egyptian females received secondary
education or higher between 2010 and 2018, compared to 71.2 percent of their
male counterparts. No wonder then that women’s share of the employment
market in 2018 remained at 22.8 percent (Gender Social Norms Index GSNI,
27). Consequently, concerns rise about women’s capability to secure income
and how that affects their household roles.
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Research Question
How did austerity measures since 2016 in Egypt empower women
financially and socially in urban middle classes households?

Hypothesis
I argue that the economic crisis and austerity have counterintuitively
empowered middle classes Egyptian women economically and socially.
Economically, the crisis made women's direct and indirect contributions
more valuable, either by generating extra income or using their non-wage work
in the household to cater to domestic consumption, substituting for purchased
goods. Socially, women’s decision-making capacity has grown in the household
as they seek to change their domestic roles to accommodate their incomegenerating (or income-saving) activities. However, coping mechanisms and
expressing such empowerment may vary according to the individual household
context, which is an area of contribution of this research by merging the private
and public domains to analyze the interrelated practices of empowerment inside
and outside households.
The independent variable in this research is the austerity measures
imposed in 2016 following the IMF loan, and the dependent variables are the
Economic and social empowerment of middle classes women. Economic
empowerment was assessed through the ability to generate income and agency
over resources (assets or skills). Social empowerment was assessed through
women’s capacity/share in household decision-making and tracing any change
in their roles.
5

Research Objectives
This research investigates the impact of austerity and economic reform
policies on women’s economic and social empowerment in urban middle
classes households. For the economic empowerment aspect, this research looks
into women’s ability to access revenue-generating activities, join the formal
employment market, and acquire the needed skills or capital to improve their
capability of generating income.
For the social and familial aspect, this research assesses whether women
got more say in family decisions, issues related to children, and household
expenses. It also looks into the space women occupy in their larger
communities, whether they have more freedom of mobility, the scope of their
social circles, and handling more out-of-household responsibilities, including
ones related to their extended families.
Potential Contribution of Research
Most research and policy decisions handle women’s economic
empowerment from a poverty elimination approach, assuming that
unempowered females are necessarily poor (Cornwall, 2016). Consequently,
literature is focused on assessing the ability of poorer women to generate
sufficient income to attain financial empowerment. Yet there is a research gap
that does not cover middle classes women, to whom the question of poverty is
less relevant, and who use economic empowerment as a tool for familial and
social empowerment. This gap is most significant in the Middle East, as there
is almost no literature on the implications of austerity on women’s economic
6

empowerment away from poverty. Also, I could not find any pieces of literature
that examine family dynamics and social empowerment of women under
austerity in the region, let alone the specific case of middle classes women.
In the case of Egypt, the official narrative asserts the state’s support for
the empowerment of women, especially through its women’s rights entity, the
National Council of Women (NCW). In 2017, NCW launched the National
Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030, which was attributed
to the Egyptian president’s vision of the “national duty and responsibility to
history to accelerate the pace of women’s empowerment”. The Strategy targets
four main aspects of empowerment; political, economic, social, and protection.
Issues like education, access to employment, inequality, family dynamics,
violence, and legislation are at the core of the programs promoted by the
initiative. Yet the data discussed earlier in this chapter does not reflect much
change in women’s social and economic empowerment in Egypt, which
suggests there is a gap between the state narrative and the outcome. And here
lays the potential contribution of my research about the economic and social
empowerment of Egyptian middle classes women under austerity.
To answer the research question posed earlier, this thesis next includes
a methodology chapter explaining the qualitative methodology used for the
research process, the reason for choosing this methodology, and its limitations.
The chapter also includes the conceptualization opted for in the research to
define what middle classes are and how to assess economic and social
empowerment. The chapter that comes after is a literature review on social
classes and empowerment. It explores the literature defining social classes and
7

how the conceptualization is positioned against this literature. It also explores
the literature on empowerment, its definitions and applications, and how it was
used in the fieldwork to assess the economic and social empowerment of the
target group. Then another literature chapter on the Egyptian middle classes,
tracing historic changes to its ideological and socio-economic structures and
women’s position in these structures. This chapter narrows down the
conceptualization from the abstract indicators of classes and empowerment in
general to Egypt’s specific case and dynamics. The last chapter explains the
findings of this research and answers the research question on how middle
classes women were (dis)empowered economically and socially in Egypt under
austerity. And finally, comes the conclusion, to sum up all the findings and
significant remarks of this research.
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Conceptualization
Collecting Data
For this research, I followed a qualitative approach to collect data that
assesses women’s economic and social empowerment under the austerity
measures by conducting ten in-depth interviews with women in female-headed
and co-headed households. While I did not have a specific interest in the
employment status of participants, I ended up with a sample of exclusively
working women. All participants were employed by the time of the interview,
even the ones who were not or were between jobs when I initially approached
them. Thus, the focus of this research was unintentionally narrowed down to
working women in the urban middle classes.
The interviews were semi-structured, including questions to assess the
participant’s understanding of the new policies, the level of income, its sources,
whether there has been an increase (like salary increase or promotion) after the
new economic policies, whether they seek more sources of income and what
they are, saving behavior, consumer behavior, the availability of assets, and how
they are being run. Other questions were focused on exploring opinions and
experiences, like priorities in expenses, whether they feel any improvement as
the data indicate less inflation and GDP growth, views about the quality of
living after imposing those policies, family time and harmony, roles within the
household, and any other questions that might come up during the conversation.
I linked this data to available literature that defines women’s empowerment and
class behavior.

9

Population
The population of this research is all urban middle classes women in
Egypt. I subscribed to Max Weber’s theory on social stratification to define this
population since this theory encompasses financial and non-financial factors to
define a social group.
The reason for choosing this population is that middle classes women
are usually understudied when it comes to tracing the social and economic
transformation that comes with austerity. The literature indicates that women’s
financial empowerment is mainly studied from a poverty perspective (Buvinić
and Gupta, 1997; Mallick and Rafi, 2010; Cornwall, 2016). It focuses on lower
classes and women’s ability to provide for the household’s basic needs, whether
it is a shared or full responsibility of the female. Yet, in the middle classes, the
question is not necessarily about providing for basic needs but sustaining the
household’s lifestyle. This effort to maintain specific consumer behavior and
expenditure usually comes with a social toll on middle classes women, whether
they are already providing for the family or have to start contributing to the
income of the household. And here lays a potential contribution of this research
by including the perspective of middle classes women on empowerment in the
literature that traditionally focused on poor households.

Identifying Middle Classes
I subscribed to Max Weber’s theory on social stratification (Calvert,
1982; Weber, 2010; Weber et al., 2013), which identifies a social class based
on three main elements; class, stand, and party. The element of class is the level
10

of income that a person or a household should have to belong to their given
social group. The element of the stand is the way of living or practices that
indicate a person’s belonging to a given social group (i.e., lifestyle). The party
is the connections and acquaintances that help a person remain in or join a given
social group and enjoy its privileges and favors. Therefore, Weber’s theory
encompasses material and non-material aspects of defining a given group and
explains social change, which is precisely what this research aims; to explain
both the financial and social implications of austerity on women’s
empowerment. Given that these implications bring change in consumption,
lifestyle, and other elements of the stand, I looked into the vulnerability to fall
off the participant’s social group/stratum and how it affects their practice of
empowerment as a result.
This stratification is applied to the middle classes in Egypt by adding
elements of the stand, like access to higher education, having assets or savings,
affordability of access to essential goods and services in the private sector (like
health and education) as well as goods and services that are deemed as
unessential (like sports and social clubs and activities, help at home, eat-outs,
etc.). The research assesses the change in these elements of stand as the financial
elements changed under the new economic policies to identify how women’s
empowerment was affected.
Data on the average income and expenditure of households in Egypt
were used as an indicator of the financial thresholds of the middle classes.
According to the Central Authority for Public Mobilization and Statistics
(CAPMAS), the average annual household income in 2015 was LE 44,193.8
(5732.75 dollars), and the average Expenditure was LE 36,709.8 (4761.9
11

dollars) 2. More recent data from CAPMAS indicate that in the fiscal year
2017/2018, the average household expenditure was 51.4 thousand EGP (2887.6
dollars), and the average household income for the same year at 58.85 thousand
EGP (3306.18 dollars). Yet the government later issued a document to advertise
funding houses for middle classes families, in which it was stated that middle
classes household annual income should not exceed 600 thousand Egyptian
pounds (37974.68 dollars), about LE 50 thousand (3164.6 dollars) per month.
Given the huge discrepancy between both figures and their inconsistency with
the abstract observations of the financial behavior of the target population, I
used the data on income as a threshold for the minimum income of the subjects
included in this research.

Assessing Empowerment
The literature identifies empowerment as a multi-dimensional concept,
influenced by interrelated factors like finances, freedoms, social norms, and
legal and policy-making (Buvinić and Gupta, 1997; Duflo, 2012; Al-Dajani and
Marlow, 2013; Griffin, 2015; Stromquist, 2016; Cornwall, 2016; Perrons, 2017;
Sharaunga et al., 2019; Roque, 2020). While some women might have access to
income or own assets and capital (both financial and human), social norms and
legal obstructions might hinder their ability to use these assets and be
empowered. That said, studies (Fuwa, 2000; Henry, 2005; Horrell and
Krishnan, 2007; Bispinar, 2010; Stampini et al., 2016) subscribe to multiple
interrelated factors to assess empowerment, like the ability to generate income,

2

EGP to dollars is calculated according to the average exchange rate in the same year.
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the ability to control the income and assets, and the ability to handle and
manipulate the social norms and community restrictions. This multidimensional
definition of empowerment aligns with Max Weber’s theorization of social
stratification, which encompasses material and non-material elements of class,
stand and party.
That said, this research assesses the economic empowerment according
to women’s ability to generate income by having a job or any source of revenue,
stability of the income, control over spending this income, and involvement in
the financial decisions of the household, whether simple daily decisions or big
ones like moving houses or buying expensive goods. Empowerment indicators
also include the ability to maintain independent finances and make savings and
the ability to find jobs or other income-generating activities.
This research assesses social empowerment according to women’s
ability to make personal and familial choices and decisions, ability to pursue
ambitions and develop careers and characters, access to social life (friendships,
family, and activities), and freedom to move in and between different places to
get errands done or for leisure.
I have been watching for other factors that compromise women’s
perception, sense, and practice of financial and social empowerment, though not
necessarily disempowering on their own. Given that the interviews were semistructured and the questions were open-ended, I could ask participants to
elaborate on points that influenced their practice and perception of
empowerment. It also allowed them to talk more about their experiences,
thoughts, and perspectives, which enriched the narrative analysis later. Such
factors include the effect of traditional gender roles (Assaad and Arntz, 2005;
13

de Koning, 2009; Roque, 2020) within the household and whether women’s
material and non-material contribution was reflected in the decision-making
dynamics. Another factor is time poverty (Fuwa, 2000), where women might be
financially and socially empowered yet burnt out and overworked inside and
outside the household. Accordingly, women’s ability to develop themselves and
keep up with the job market is compromised.

Sampling
I followed a mix of selective and snowballing sampling techniques to
reach out to potential participants, as half of the sample was selected directly
from my extended social network and the other half was through referrals. This
technique affected the course of the research as explained earlier, where I ended
up with a sample of working women or women who had a change in
employment status after years of being housewives. Consequently, the sample
was further narrowed down to focus on working women of the urban middle
classes.
A pre-chat with each participant was essential to make sure she was fit
for the research and could grasp the studied concepts. The pre-chat was a 15
minutes call on average, during which I explained to the participants what the
research is about, the concepts it assesses, and the type of questions included.
It was also a chance to break the ice, check availability and arrange for suitable
timings. Participants were carefully chosen in this phase to ensure they were
information-rich and suitable for the research.
During the phase of the interviews, I have been watching for the
saturation point (i.e., when the narratives become redundant and similar in a
14

way that does not add much to the research) to assess when and how to expand
and diversify the sample in terms of belonging to a certain stratum, a type of
household, and social context.

Interview design
The interviews were semi-structured, starting with screening questions
about the amount and sources of income, expenditure, and the main provider for
the family both before and after the austerity measures. The second set of
questions was about family dynamics, how the family was affected by the
measure imposed in 2016, coping mechanisms, how women support their
families, and whether they started any income-generating activities. The third
set of questions was about how women perceive their family role, how their
decision-making capacity within the family was affected, whether they feel
more valued and appreciated, how their space in their local communities is
affected, and whether they have more social freedoms or burdens.
I added follow-up questions on points where I felt the need to elaborate
on women’s understanding of empowerment and how they see themselves in
this light. Other questions were dedicated for women to describe their feelings
about their current roles and statuses in their households and whether they find
it fulfilling. A list of questions is available at the end of the thesis as an appendix.

Data Analysis
I followed a narrative analysis to assess how participants comprehended
the events they had been through and how their economic and social contexts
15

were affected. There are two reasons why this analysis method works better for
my research; the first is that there is a research gap on the subject, and there is
no fixed pattern to the link between empowerment and austerity in Egypt. This
research explores how the participants find this link in their own experiences.
The second reason is that the narrative analysis focuses more on how people see
and voice their own experiences and stories, which better helps draw
conclusions that can be generalized among all the participants.
For coding the interviews, I opt to mix deductive and inductive coding
techniques. The semi-structured interviews provided data about an initial set of
themes to investigate and question, which makes the bases for the deductive
technique. At the same time, the interviews were open to discussing other issues
and themes that come up in the conversation, and that is when the inductive
themes need to be added. Besides, the sense of empowerment is individual and
subjective to a great extent, meaning that what makes one person feel
empowered does not necessarily make another feel the same. For example, a
participant found that taking over more financial responsibilities empowers her,
another felt it burdening and repressive, and a third felt a mix of both, all for
different reasons. That’s where the flexibility of the inductive method is needed.
I have made sure that this subjectivity does not alienate the fixed variables of
the research by having fixed questions to assess the variables mentioned earlier
and adding other self-expressive questions. I used the subjective parts of the
interview in the analysis to give more insights into the narratives’ social
contexts and extract other unintended results.

16

Limitations
Given the political atmosphere in Egypt, people might find it a risk to
participate in studies that question the aftermath of government policies.
Guarantees like anonymity and change in personal detail were provided for the
participants.
Some of the concepts discussed in the interview and the study were
unfamiliar to some participants. The screening pre-chats included providing a
list of terms and what they mean in the context of the research and asking if the
participant needed any further elaboration on any of the concepts.
The covid-19 situation and social distancing rules was an obstacle to
mobility and conducting face-to-face interviews. As a result, all communication
was conducted through social media applications and online calls. I used
Facebook messenger and Zoom to conduct all interviews and send the Informed
Consent Form (ICF). All interviews were audio-recorded, the shortest was 25
minutes, and the longest was 46 minutes, besides an additional unrecorded time
before and after the interview to break the ice and explain the process. The
discrepancy in the interview timings is mainly due to personal differences
among the participants in terms of their understanding of concepts and events
related to the research, the magnitude of details they were willing to share, and
the need to rephrase questions and revisit points in some instances.

17

The Research Process
I conducted ten in-depth interviews with middle classes working women
from diversified financial spectrums within this social group, classified
according to their consumption behavior, their lifestyle, neighborhoods where
they live, schools where their children go, their access to goods and services,
and magnitude of adjustments they made to their consumption after austerity.
According to this classification, four participants come from the upper-middle
class, in the sense that they live in slightly elevated neighborhoods but not in
gated communities, have a car or two in the household, send their children to
private/international schools but not the highly paid ones, can afford social and
sports clubs and the adjustments they made to their lifestyle and consumption
were mainly in luxuries. Another four participants come from the middle class,
where they live in neighborhoods that are densely populated but not sha`abi,
send their children to private education but not an international one, cannot
afford socializing in social and sports clubs, and the adjustments they made to
their consumption after austerity were cutting off luxuries and going for cheaper
alternatives to the basic needs. Finally, two from the lower-middle/vulnerable
class, in the sense that they made a downgrade after austerity from middle to
lower-middle classes but did not fall into poverty, and made tough adjustments
to their lifestyle, giving up many essentials like certain types of food, skipping
meals, not able to afford transportation at some points and not able to afford
socializing. I have also diversified the social context through which each
participant lives to understand better the impact of the economic measures in
different types of households. I have interviewed five women in co-headed
households with children, two women from co-headed households with no
18

children, two divorced women from female-headed households, one of which is
a single mother, and one woman who is not married and still lives with her
family. Given the problematic nature of the figures about the income and
expenditure of the middle classes’ households in Egypt, I have incorporated
other elements that define the middle classes’ lifestyle (i.e., elements of stand
and party in Weber’s terms). These elements include being professionals in
traditional professions, like education, engineering, media, and administrative
jobs. Other elements include having access to private, non-luxurious services of
education, healthcare, and food supplies (i.e., not dependent on state subsidies)
and access to popular venues of entertainment like eating out, traveling
domestically for a holiday, and going to cinemas and theatres.
During the process, I noticed that I reached a saturation point with the
category of women in co-headed households with children by the fifth
interview. The narratives became similar despite the variation in age groups,
financial situation, types of expenses, the proximity of the places where they
live, and their distinct career and social choices. I then had to diversify the
remainder of the sample by seeking a variety in each participant's social and
familial context, hence the inclusion of women from different types of
households and social statuses.
Challenges through the process
I have faced some challenges in the data collection process. The first
was finding suitable candidates who agreed to be part of the research. I
overcame this challenge by using a mix of selective and snowballing selection

19

techniques. I reached out to my connections who fit the selection criteria and
relied on recommendations and word of mouth to refer me to others.
The second challenge was to make sure that the candidates fit the criteria
of choice in terms of being in a middle classes household financially and
socially. Some of the candidates came from wealthier families (upper/upper
middle classes) and had to make a downgrade in their lifestyle to become in the
lower spectrums of middle classes. Other candidates came from rural middle
classes households and made changes to their lifestyle to become urban. Other
candidates changed their circumstances during the process, like getting a job
after being a stay-at-home mother, moving from freelancing to a fixed job, or
relocating abroad. These changes were challenging because people usually shy
away from discussing their backgrounds, financial situation, and class issues,
which might compromise the outcome of the data. That’s why lengthy pre-chat
sessions were required to make sure that the candidate was aware of such
changes and open to speaking up about herself.
The third challenge was related to the honesty of the answers. I felt that
the candidates were hesitant to answer some questions or give away some
details on various occasions in the interviews. I handled this by multiple
techniques; the first was to reassure the candidate about the privacy of the
agreement and her data. The second technique was to make follow-up questions
by rephrasing the question itself or picking on a specific detail and asking for
more explanation to ensure that I got the correct answer she meant. The third
technique was diverting from the point that initiated the hesitation, discussing
another element that the candidate might be more open to speaking about, then
asking the question again in a different context when the candidate is more
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comfortable. Some candidates gave more detailed and honest answers when I
used the third technique.
The fourth challenge was to make sure that the candidates had the
minimum required understanding of the economic measures that have been
happening in Egypt since 2016. This was resolved during the pre-chat and the
interview itself by trying to simplify what I mean by the measures on the microlevel and the kind of impact they had on the livelihood of the people.
The fifth and last challenge was related to reassurance and security,
where some candidates I approached were afraid to be identified in the study.
Some candidates pulled out after initial approvals. To handle that, I made
assurances by explaining that the identity of the participants would remain
secret, that the recordings would not be accessed by a third party, and sharing
the documents that prove I have necessary approvals from CAPMAS and
sharing the Informed Consent Form. Also, the selective sampling technique
helped in this situation, as I could refer to previous communications or mutual
contacts who can make such guarantees.
Fieldwork was concluded successfully after handling all the previous
limitations, and the outcome is presented in later chapters. However, to
understand the themes in the narratives of the participants, it had to be
positioned in light of the literature available on the definition and practice of
empowerment, social stratification theories, and the socio-economic and
ideological contexts of Egypt.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
Answering the research question posed in this thesis about how austerity
in Egypt empowered middle classes women is multidisciplinary and requires
looking into literature on gender, austerity, and class. This literature review
starts by exploring the effect of austerity on gender balance and women’s
economic and social empowerment, followed by exploring what empowerment
means in such a context. It will then explore the literature on the class factor
and how middle classes households are affected by austerity, then narrow down
to look into women of the middle classes under austerity.

Empowerment and Austerity
It is well established in the literature that women get the short end of the
straw when it comes to the consequences of austerity (Ortiz and Cummins,
2013; Griffin, 2015; Périvier, 2016; Perrons, 2017). Research shows that
women usually are more prone to vulnerability, more likely to lose their jobs or
get lower wages, carry over more duties, and endure other mental health and
social consequences. Studies on the 2008 economic crisis in Europe (Griffin,
2015; Périvier, 2016; Perrons, 2017), for instance, state that women became
more vulnerable economically and socially under austerity. One of the studies
quoted is a joint one with Fawcett Society and Women’s Budget Group. It
shows that 80 percent of the burden of austerity and budget cuts in the United
Kingdom falls onto women, as they mostly work in government and social care
sectors that get more affected by cuts. The study also estimated that “the real
income of female-headed households, typically lone parents and single female
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pensioners, will lose 20% by 2020” (Perrons, 2017, 32) as those measures
continue. The term “sh(e)-austerity” was coined as a result, as the female
employment rate and the cuts in industries that women tend to occupy did not
recover as much as that of men (Perrons, 2017).
More women were hit financially after the 2008 financial crisis as they
worked in the public sector under pay cuts in the larger European context.
Women became the main breadwinners of many households as men lost their
private-sector jobs, yet it was not met with a significant change in household
responsibilities and dynamics. Here emerged the “added worker effect,” as
women sought to find additional sources of income to make up for the lost jobs
of their partners. In countries where women already had less share in the labor
market (like Italy, Greece, and Spain), the “added worker effect” was higher in
comparison to other countries where women’s participation in the labor market
was higher (Périvier, 2016). Similarly, in the case of Egypt, women (who
constitute a quarter of the labor market according to the NCW) are placed under
the added worker effect as they seek money-generating opportunities to provide
for their households, yet it is not clear how this affects their role in the family.
Besides the evident economic and social effect of the 2008 global
economic crisis on gender balance and women’s financial and social positions,
the crisis also resulted in a setback to the gender-sensitive policymaking. In
response to the crisis and its policymaking aftermath, a feminist approach
emerged under the name of “crisis governance feminism,” aiming to reinforce
gender considerations in policymaking. Penny Griffin (2015) investigated this
approach by looking into how “gendered responses to the global financial crisis,
including, in particular, the dismissal of ill-fitting feminist critique and the co23

option of feminist knowledge, have contributed both to the promotion of global
finance based on neo-liberal, masculine privilege and the longevity of
neoliberal, capitalist imperatives in the global political economy.” (Griffin,
2015, 50).
Although the feminist body of literature and scholarship has become outspoken
about the imbalanced global economic order and the failure of neo-liberal
institutions to accommodate women’s place in the economy and safeguard
female financial empowerment, the situation remained idle on the policymaking front. And like what happened in the 1980s debt crisis, the East Asian
crisis and the crisis in Argentina, Griffin (2015) concluded that the 2008 crisis
was yet another failure for the feminist analysis, which remained a “flawed
scholarship and ignorant policy-making that further exacerbate, or even create,
hierarchies and inequalities of labor, class, gender and sexual relations.”
(Griffin, 2015, 52).
Regarding the gap in scholarship, literature is more focused on the
economic gender balance in rich economies and lacks gender-based analysis of
financial crises in poorer countries. Throughout this research, only one paper
could be found to tackle the risk austerity measures pose to vulnerable groups
in the developing economies, particularly women and children. A study by Ortiz
and Cummins (2013) states that one-quarter of developing countries went
through economic shrinkage and had to make considerable cuts in the public
expenditure, wages, subsidies, pensions, and safety nets in response to the
global financial crisis in 2008. But the situation of those countries was
overlooked in the literature due to the gaps in data available. The study, which
relied on 2012 data from IMF, mentioned that Egypt was among the most
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affected countries in the Middle East and had to make adjustments in policies
related to social protection, subsidies, and pensions. It concluded that those
“budget cuts pose clear risks to children and women in terms of their impact on
the level and quality of essential public assistance” and that “Protecting
vulnerable populations is critical to equitably sharing the adjustment costs and
avoiding detrimental or even irreversible effects on children and women.”
(Ortiz and Cummins, 2013, 73-74). As the IMF-related measures were added to
this risky situation in Egypt in 2016, it is plausible to assume that such risks are
becoming higher now. Here lays one aspect of the potential contribution of this
research, wherein the absence of data and analysis on the effect of austerity on
women in developing economies, and Egypt in specific, this paper investigates
how Egyptian women were adjusted economically and socially to austerity
through first-hand experiences.

Why does empowerment matter?
In 2000, the United Nations listed women’s empowerment among the
Millennium Development Goals as a crucial pillar for development. In the
following year, 2001, the World Bank released a report titled “Engendering
Development,” where it argued that empowering women economically and
inside households boosts development at the macro level, as it increases the
welfare of the families, leads to better use of resources, and expands and
diversifies the workforce. Ten years later, the World Bank released another
World Development Report in which it stated that gender equality and women
empowerment “should be a goal by itself.” Such statements and
recommendations echo the feminist literature that argues that women’s
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empowerment is an issue that transcends the private household structure into
the

bigger

socio-economic

structures.

Economic

development

and

empowerment are interrelated in a causation effect. For the better-off societies,
it is argued that development provides more opportunities for women by
creating bigger markets and more need for skilled workers. And for poorer
classes, development is argued to ease the grip of poverty, hence helping
families to allocate more resources to their daughters (i.e., empower them)
(Duflo, 2012). Similarly, neoliberal economic measures are claimed to support
women’s economic empowerment by establishing a gender-blind market that
cares only about skillful labor regardless of gender or race. But it was evident
that without a fundamental change in social dynamics (i.e., social empowerment
of women), such economic opportunities will remain a mere influx of women
into the existing socio-economic system in a manner that burdens them even
more (Nadasen, 2012/2013).
On the other hand, women’s economic and social empowerment boosts
development even in poorer economies. An example comes from land
ownership in Ghana, where women’s insecurity about their ownership and
capacity to make decisions regarding farming lands makes them avoid risky
measures like fallowing land. On the other hand, when women are empowered
with their sense of ownership and decision-making capacity, they tend to invest
more in the assets, hence better production (Duflo, 2012). Similar to familial
and social empowerment, giving women more weight in decision-making
maintains the welfare and health of household members, especially children, as
women tend to allocate a greater share of household resources to them than men
do. This way, it is guaranteed that proper human capital will keep developing to
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keep the system going (Fuwa, 2000; Duflo, 2012; Johansson de Silva et al.,
2014).

Defining Empowerment
This research assesses women’s economic empowerment based on two
factors; having access to generating income and agency by having control over
assets. It has been evident in multiple pieces of literature (Buvinić and Gupta,
1997; Horrell and Krishnan, 2008; Al-Dajani and Marlow, 2013; Bayissa et al.,
2017; Sharaunga et al., 2018) that women may have access to income, but are
not necessarily empowered as they cannot control the sources or use of this
income. A study on female-headed households in Zimbabwe shows that the
factor of agency placed limitations on women’s economic empowerment. It also
asserts that the level of income is not the only indicator of (dis)empowerment
because “being income poor is the most obvious but, being asset poor may be
equally detrimental.” (Horrell and Krishnan, 2008, 1352). A similar study on
female-headed households in Chile, Columbia, Honduras, and India concluded
that 38 out of the 61 cases reviewed were overrepresented among the poor and
could secure proper income. Yet women in those households were not
financially empowered as they did not have control over assets and means of
production (i.e., agency) (Buvinić and Gupta, 1997). Such assets extend to
“human capital, such as education and the number of people available to work
in the household; to social capital which enables people to engage in networks,
to develop markets and mitigate risk.” (Horrell and Krishnan, 2008, 1352).
The question of the agency was taken into a broader light, and a new
body of literature identified empowerment as a multidimensional process with
27

familial, socio-cultural, legal, psychological, and political aspects. And to assess
women’s empowerment, studies should look into the relationship between
economic empowerment and the aforementioned aspects (Bayissa et al., 2017).
The multi-dimensional assessment of empowerment was evident in a study
about women in the Msinga Local Municipality in South Africa, where
Sharaunga et al. (2018) identify agency (both social and economic) and access
to resources as the most significant indicators to assess how empowered women
are. They also highlight differences in social and cultural contexts, where
women’s ideas about the outcome of empowerment vary. Consequently, the
study identified empowerment as “The multidimensional process of increasing
the capacity/capabilities (i.e., resources and agency) of individuals or groups to
make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and
outcomes.” (Sharaunga et al., 2018, 5).
Another multidimensional study on female Ethiopian entrepreneurs
found that economic, familial, and social aspects (i.e., having more power over
decision-making in families and local communities) were most interrelated in
making women feel empowered. The study confirmed the classic assumption;
that as women earn more income, they gain more say in their families. But such
sequence is conditioned by the level of income, as women who could not secure
enough income to make them totally independent from men could not be as
empowered in familial and social aspects (Bayissa et al., 2017).
The same sequence of economic empowerment’s effect on familial and
social contexts was evident in a ten-year study of Palestinian refugee women in
Jordan. The study concluded that home-based embroidery businesses helped
women gain more share of power in their households. Women were more
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capable of making family decisions, improved the welfare of their households,
and expanded their social space and presence in their communities. The study
also revealed that women were motivated to overcome constrained
opportunities in their communities and formed an organized group that created
their embroidery market (Al-Dajani and Marlow, 2013). This makes the process
of empowerment not restricted to the micro family-scale but extends to the
communities, a notion described in empowerment literature as making the
personal political. This notion comes at the heart of this research, as it builds on
it to assess how the macroeconomic measures impact the individual social and
economic situations of women within their households and communities.
To sum up, empowerment has multiple interrelated factors to define and
assess it. Owning capital (both material and human) or access to any source of
income is not a guarantee that a woman is empowered. The factor of agency
over resources is as essential as ownership for a woman to exercise and sustain
this empowerment (Buvinić and Gupta, 1997; Al-Dajani and Marlow, 2013;
Sharaunga et al., 2018; Bayisset al., 2017). The social context also affects how
a woman is positioned in her community, hence her ability to exercise
empowerment. While some women find a space to manipulate and twist norms
and social pressure, others remain disempowered because they cannot or do not
know how to manipulate. Hereby, this research opts for the multidimensional
assessment of empowerment; financial empowerment by having access to
income and the ability to control and maintain it through decision-making and
self-development, and social empowerment through having enough social space
and freedoms to form and maintain relationships and make personal choices.
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Women’s Empowerment and Social Classes
The literature has proven that the understanding and attainment of
empowerment vary along class and cultural lines. Each class or social group
perceives and executes empowerment differently. Also, empowerment has long
been studied as a form of social change that works in the same dynamics as class
struggle/change (Bispinar, 2010; Al-Dajani and Marlow, 2013; Stampini et al.,
2016). For instance, change in gender relations, being the early theorization of
empowerment, was derived from the theories of social change. Similar to
Marx’s analysis of the oppressed (working classes) as the key player to bring
change in class relations, empowerment theories believed that the oppressed
(women in this context) should lead a process of change to gain equal rights to
men (Stromquist, 2015).
Empowerment was early identified inexplicitly as part of the
development and social change work in the 1970s, but the first
conceptualization came a decade later in vague terms such as “change in power
relations” within the society and giving women access to “equal rights as men”
(Cornwall, 2016). And the goal was to make women as capable as men to bring
about change to social structures and equal access to power agents (financial
resources and decision-making in family and society). It was identified later that
in many societies, women might have the will for change, yet they do not
necessarily have the financial means, and that’s when the question of poverty
took over the understanding of empowerment. As a result, another concern grew
in feminist scholarship about the possibility of losing the social change gest in
favor of finances. A new body of literature came up to identify empowerment
as a social movement to resist and challenge the existing power relations within
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society, gain equal control over material and social sources of power, and – in
a developed format – a grassroots movement that presses for political change to
paternal power structures (Cornwall, 2016).
While this understanding of empowerment was taking place in
scholarship, a new understanding of class emerged. It was a migration from the
predominant view of class as a “communities of individuals bounded by
common social status” (Henry, 2005, 766) that was widely employed and
supported by marketers in the first half of the twentieth century. Scholars at that
time developed the perception of class in light of the huge urban change and
growth of bigger, more cosmopolitan cities. Inter-class analysis was developed
later to accommodate the elements of distinction among individual households
or smaller communities within the same class. One such development of
concepts was introducing the term “Habitus” (Bourdieu, 1984) to include the
elements that shape an individual’s sense of belonging to a certain class or social
group. Encompassing such elements as consumption patterns/lifestyle, age and
gender have developed the study of social and economic implications of
policies, making women’s perception and practice of empowerment an agent
within the study of different social classes.

Class divides and their impact on understanding and performing
empowerment are evident in a study about women’s sense of empowerment in
Turkey, which found that what constitutes empowerment differed among social
classes. While women of lower/poorer classes felt more empowered by having
strong family bonds, women of the middle classes felt more empowered by
sustaining their social status and passing it to their children, and women of upper
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classes felt more empowered by having social connections or investing in their
careers. 3 Such perceptions were independent of having a job and contributing
to household income, but still, women who wished to work in all classes found
their way to manipulate the social structures where they lived, contribute to
family decision making and highlight the worthiness of their jobs. The women
of each class used unique manipulation and coping mechanisms to gain more
influence within the same social structure and more agency over resources
(Bespinar, 2010).
This class divide was clear again with the introduction of Neoliberal
policies, where “some women, especially economically better-off, educated
women have benefitted from the dismantling of the old patriarchal order.
However, as many authors have argued, because neoliberalism promotes the
idea of a rational individual exercising free will while eroding social democracy,
it has made life harder for most women and has widened the race/class divide
among women.” (Nadasen, 2012/2013). And along all class lines and different
economic contexts, similar social burdens are placed upon women, yet under
different labels, like the double day, time poverty, added worker effect or
transmission of disadvantage to children (Fuwa, 2000). This makes the
dominating literature that looks into empowerment from a poverty elimination
perspective (i.e., that of poorer classes), unrepresentative of other social classes,
naming the middle classes as the subject of this research.
Taking such variations in understanding empowerment along class and
culture lines into consideration and looking at them in their context is what
This echoes Max Weber’s theory of social stratification (as will come later) where despite
the discrepancy in the financial situation of each group (Class), elements of stand and party
were an integral part of how individuals in all groups perceive and define themselves and
their sense of empowerment.
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Cornwall referred to as “engagement with culturally embedded normative
beliefs, understandings, and ideas about gender, power and change.” (Cornwall,
2016, 345). This cultural accommodation aims to understand women’s unique
sense of empowerment in different cultures, communities, and classes in a
model where change happens as part of a relational process (specific to each
culture/context) to shift the consciousness of men and women to accommodate
women’s needs better and right in the same manner as men. Here, again, lays
another area of the potential contribution of this research, as it excludes the
question of poverty from the assessment of empowerment (a fear among gender
theorists, as explained earlier) and exposes the narratives of middle classes
women who are equally concerned about the social aspects of empowerment as
the economic one.
Theories on Middle Classes
The literature on empowerment was initially a derivative of the Marxist
theory of social classes and change. And as the literature on gender developed
to study the inter and intra-class understanding of empowerment, it outgrew the
Marxist class stratification that divided the society into a minority upper class
(Bourgeoisie) and the majority of lower/working class (Proletariat). This
Marxist vision did not place much emphasis on the middle classes caught
between the two competing Bourgeoisie and Proletariat classes. It did not give
much attention to the gender element and its implications either. In fact, Marx
thought that the middle classes would vanish into either of the two main classes;
the lower middle classes of craftsmen, shopkeepers, and workshop owners sink
into the Proletariat, while the upper-middle classes of scientists, philosophers,
doctors, and similar profession become attached to the upper class of the
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Bourgeoisie which “converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the
man of science into its paid wage laborers.” (Marx and Engels, 2010, 4).
As empowerment developed into a multidimensional process with
familial, socio-cultural, legal, psychological, and political aspects, it has
become more in line with Max Weber’s theorization of social stratification,
which encompasses material and non-material elements of class, stand, and
party. The financial element of Weber’s theory is through the class; a term he
linked exclusively to economic interests where a class, any class, is “a group of
people who have a causal component of their life chances in common, and when
this causal component is represented exclusively by economic interests in
possession of goods and the opportunities of income, and when the causal
component is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor
market.” (Weber, 2010, 138). And those classes vary according to the kind of
asset or capital they possess, the kind of service they offer, and their desirability
in the market. That’s why the Weberian concept of class “is always organized
around one common principle: it is the kind of chances in the market that
determines the common conditions of the individual’s fate. ‘Class Situation’ in
this sense ultimately is ‘Market Situation’.” (Weber, 2010, 139). Accordingly,
any class action or change is a reaction to the structure of economic order and
the distribution of property and assets. This link between market situation and
class corresponds to the issue of economic empowerment (which is a kind of
social action itself)
The non-materialistic stratification of social groups, according to
Weber, is related to the stand or status, which is the kind of honor or prestige a
person gets from belonging to a certain group or race or having a certain lifestyle
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or mode of consumption. Class and status are not mutually exclusive, but they
are not necessarily correlated either. A person might belong to a given
status/stand because they possess a specific type or amount of assets that enable
them to lead a certain lifestyle. On the other hand, people might need to attain
certain status to be eligible for better opportunities in the market, hence better
class. That said, “both propertied and propertyless people can belong to the
same stand, and often they do with very perceptible consequences, no matter
how precarious this ‘social equality’ becomes in the long run.” (Weber, 2010,
143). Still, within the terms of the stand, there are distinctions between the
privileged stand groups who grew into a certain lifestyle or title or honor, and
the new individuals who joined based on the change that happened in the class
part that caused the change in their lifestyle and ability to consume. Weber’s
theory about this change in the stand is that its stability is an enemy to the idea
of the free market, where a stagnant classification of groups within the stand
means that the modes of production and consumption are monopolized by the
same groups. Yet “destabilization by technical and economic change, and
upheaval, however, can threaten the stand stratification by pushing the ‘class
situation’ into the foreground.” (Weber, 2010, 148). Weber’s link between class
(finances) and stand and how they affect each other, bring changes within the
same social strata or even move people from one stratum to another, resonates
with the literature on empowerment (Fuwa, 2000; Bespinar, 2010; Al-Dajani
and Marlow, 2013) that links women’s sense and understanding of
empowerment to the culture of the social group they belong to and the kind of
burdens (both financial and social) they endure accordingly. This notion of the
relation between the economic and social and its effect on social
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mobility/stability and empowerment is another part that this research aimed to
assess among women of the middle classes in Egypt. Looking into the narratives
of Egyptian middle classes women in this research sheds new light on the
understanding of empowerment in new terms, not just poverty-related ones, and
fills the gap in the literature that did not relate to the variations in perceptions
along class lines.
The third pillar in Weber’s social stratification is the party, which is the
affiliation to a certain political or social group or movement. This party does
not necessarily have to be on the greater political spectrum of the state but can
be in a minor context like communities or clubs to gain the power to bring about
change in either the stand or the class. Given that parties are mostly based on
ideology and the ability to act upon it, they are generally class and stand blind.
Weber’s idea about the parties is driven by the assumption that “societies have
some rational order and an apparatus of persons available who are ready to
enforce the rational order. The goal of the party is to influence this apparatus
and, if possible, form the apparatus itself out of the party followers.” (Weber,
2010, 149).
So, for the purpose of this research, Weber’s theory of class stratification
seems more plausible as it encompasses the materialistic, social, and ideological
aspects of defining a given group and explaining social change. This is precisely
what this research aims; to explain the economic and social implications (i.e.,
social and economic action) of austerity on women's empowerment (i.e., a social
group).
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Defining Middle Classes
Scholarship on social classes has for long been more focused on
questions related to poverty and accumulation of wealth, while the middle
classes remain overlooked. The few studies that target middle classes are
income-focused, as an economic analysis of middle-income groups, with the
assumption that income (class according to Weber) is what secures social
privileges (stand according to Weber) for a certain group. One of the approaches
used to identify the middle classes in literature (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008;
Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2014; Stampini et al., 2016) is to study levels of
consumption based on the income to test the main hypotheses about the middle
classes; that it is where entrepreneurship and employment are generated, that
the middle classes values of accumulation of human capital and savings are
central for capitalist accumulation and that the consumption pattern of middle
classes and its demand for quality consumer goods feeds investment in
production and marketing, which in turn raises income levels for the whole
economy. That is precisely what Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2008)
did in their research, as they tried to identify the middle classes in emerging
economies in terms of their pattern of consumption. Early on in the research,
they stated that no global dataset exists to identify middle classes “however, a
growing number of household surveys have been done in low- and middleincome countries around the world.” (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008, 4). Driven by
those surveys, the authors rely on income as an indicator of Purchasing Power
Parity of the middle classes in 13 countries. They used the data to identify two
groups of households at the lower and upper ends of the middle classes;
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households whose daily per capita expenditures valued at Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP) are between $2 and $4 and other households between $6 and $10.
But the authors find later that households with PPP of between two and four
dollars were practically poor lower class, not middle classes, yet they were
proven to be better off than the poor who live on two or below-two dollars a
day. Here emerges a problem with using finances as the sole indicator to identify
a certain social group; it is unrepresentative of realities that incorporate other
factors related to behavior and lifestyle (i.e., Weber’s element of Stand).
The confusion that Banerjee and Duflo (2008) found concerning the
lower end of the middle classes’ income can be better understood through the
“vulnerability approach”. It is an economic approach that defines layers of the
middle classes in terms of vulnerability to fall into poverty once their income
drops. Such an approach helps to identify both the growth and shrinkage of the
middle classes, as it was first used to assess the outcome of development and
change in economic policies, making it suitable for this research. Under this
approach, once the income increases, a person/household is moved above the
poverty line and placed in the safe zone against risks of falling into poverty, to
be used as an indicator of the growth of the middle classes. The same concept
works in rev,erse where “it is possible to find the income level associated with
a set of assets and socioeconomic characteristics that would allow the
households to be less vulnerable to fall into poverty due to idiosyncratic and
asymmetric shocks”.

(Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2014, 26). These

socioeconomic characteristics correspond to Weber’s theory on being born into
a certain stand as a guarantee of access to opportunities that secure the same
income (i.e., remain in the same class).
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This vulnerability approach has been widely used in case studies about
the middle classes, especially in poor and developing economies. One study
targeted the middle classes of Latin America, in which Stampini et al. looked
into the effect of poverty reduction policies on securing the middle classes
against falling into poverty again and measured the vulnerability of each class.
The study used daily per capita income as an indicator for each class through a
synthetic panel methodology, as the study “divides the population into five
groups: (i) the extreme poor, with income below $2.5, (ii) the moderately poor,
between $2.5 and 4, (iii) the vulnerable between $4 and 10, (iv) the middle
classes between $10 and 50, and (v) the high-income class, above $50”
(Stampini et al., 2016, 4). The study also combined the factor of poverty
duration to assess the chances of middle and vulnerable (i.e., lower middle)
classes to fall into poverty. Again, the population was divided into another four
categories; chronic poor who have been in the lower classes for five years or
more, transit poor who have been poor for four years or less, the future poor
who are either vulnerable (lower middle) or middle classes or any group that
falls into poverty during the term of the study, and finally the never poor who
are always above the $4 poverty line. Combining the two factors of solid income
figures and duration of being in a given category of income does not only
measure the person’s position on the social ladder but also provides an insight
into the ability to remain in the same position or class and maintain the lifestyle
related to it. Such insight is significant when studying the middle classes, which
are supposed to maintain a certain level of consumption for a wider spectrum of
goods over time, maybe even buying assets and investments that need long term
financial commitment, in comparison to lower and poorer classes who are
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unable to consume such goods or services. As more middle classes households
fall into the vulnerability category of the lower-middle class, hence becoming
unable to maintain this level of consumption and give up on certain goods, it
indicates the effect that the policies in place have on the micro-level. Following
this notion, my research looks into this vulnerability element by following the
change in consumption patterns, access to services, accumulation/liquidation of
assets, and re-arrangement of priorities within the sample households to analyze
the change in other non-financial elements, naming women empowerment. This
correspondent to Max Weber’s theory on categorizing classes, where earning a
certain income (class), assets possession, and ability to lead a certain lifestyle
(stand) both define a person’s placement on the social ladder. And that’s how
Stampini et al. concluded; that middle classes families in Latin America are still
exposed to a substantial risk of falling into poverty, unlike the assumption that
middle classes are relatively safer. The study also found that 14 percent of the
studied middle classes families went through at least one episode of poverty
during the decade-long study, which did not necessarily move them vertically
on the social ladder, yet maximized the risk they endured and reflected on the
stability of the policies in place.
The vulnerability approach has been used extensively to study femaleheaded households in developing countries compared to male-headed ones. The
reasons for vulnerability are not exclusively related to the economic situation in
the country, but sometimes it is about the cultural context. In a study on the food
security of Female-headed households in Bangladesh, Mallick and Rafi (2010)
found that women’s limited access to food production activities did not
necessarily make them poor, yet made them more vulnerable in case they were
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not provided for. The study targeted an indigenous group in one of the Bengali
villages and found that the absence of social restrictions among poorer groups
made women more capable of participating in income-generating activities,
unlike women of other classes and urban communities who are usually bound
to social norms. Also, the absence of formal economic institutions has, in fact,
improved the ability of these poor social groups to manage their resources as
“the finding is indicative in the sense that noneconomic institutions can
significantly impact economic outcomes such as improving the food security of
a household, especially the female-headed one. It has important policy
implications as well. The design of developmental assistance programs should
take into consideration the social and cultural heterogeneity even within a region
in a country.” (Mallick and Rafi, 2010, 594). That said, urban middle classes
who live under the policies of the economic institutions seem to be more prone
to the outcome of these policies and even more burdened by the social context
they live in.
Comparing the work of Banerjee and Duflo to that of Stampini et al.
proves that there is no fixed global income figure to determine the middle
classes in all countries. The 6-10 dollars figure used by Banerjee and Duflo as
the upper middle classes in the 13 studied countries was the income of the
vulnerable group in Stampini et al.’s model. So, putting data on income into
local context is key to better reflect on the reality of the financial situation of
households. In the case of Egypt, Central Authority for Public Mobilization and
Statistics (CAPMAS) puts the figure of average annual household income at LE
44,193.8, a figure that fits into the vulnerable category in Stampini et al.’s
model. This discrepancy reflects the same problem both studies encountered
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when trying to apply the international figures in local terms. But a 2019 report
by the World Bank on poverty, vulnerability, and middle classes in Egypt set a
benchmark for the poverty line in the country at an income of 3.5 dollars a day,
above which comes the income of the vulnerable and lower-middle classes. To
further determine the finances of the vulnerable and middle classes, the World
Bank used consumption figures so that the vulnerable group’s consumption was
between 5,748 and 7,644 EGP per person per year, and the middle classes’
consumption level was between 7,644 EGP and 11,496 EGP per person per
year 4. More recent data from CAPMAS, though, indicate that in the fiscal year
2017/2018, the average household expenditure was 51.4 thousand EGP. The
average household income for the same year was 58.85 thousand EGP.
This confusion with data and financial approaches defining social
classes gives more merit to Weber’s theory, as it has been evident that elements
of stand and consumptions behavior or lifestyle play a huge role in defining how
income is accessed and used. Even when studies tried to take a strictly financial
approach (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; Mallick and Rafi, 2010; Lopez-Calva and
Ortiz-Juarez, 2014; Stampini et al., 2016), non-economic factors imposed
themselves on the outcome.
To summarize, gender-related concepts and their practice and
implications in the private and public spheres are akin to inter and intra-class
analysis. No one general understanding encompasses how women of all classes
perceive and practice empowerment. As proven earlier, literature, especially
that on the global south, looks into the economic empowerment of women from
a poverty elimination perspective, focusing on women of poorer classes and

4

World Bank Data is based on 2015 data it obtained from CAPMAS

42

leaving women of other social groups understudied. Consequently, broader
social, non-financial elements are absent from the study of empowerment,
elements of stand and party in Weber’s terms. Elements like the ability to make
personal choices, pursue ambitions, develop careers, maintain a social life, and
freedom to move around are as decisive as finances in defining empowerment,
especially for social groups that aim beyond securing basic needs.
That said, this research aims to fill the aforementioned gap in the specific
case of Egypt, as more households fall into the vulnerability group and adjust
their lifestyle to their new financial reality. Women also change their
perceptions and practices of empowerment accordingly, both inside households
and in the larger social sphere.
The above theorization and research efforts on defining middle classes
and assessing empowerment remain abstract, though. Historical discourses of
how the Egyptian middle classes were formed and transformed in modern
history resulted in tremendous and rapid shifts in Egypt’s social stratification.
Egyptian women had to adjust according to these changes, some of which
resulted from shifts in state policies, and others were related to the global socioeconomic and political changes. The next chapter explores the history of
Egypt’s social stratification, the foundation of the modern middle classes,
ideological and socio-economic changes, and women’s place within different
phases.
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Chapter 4: The Egyptian Middle Classes

The Egyptian middle classes in the current demographic and socioeconomic structure, as a class of educated, salaried employees, are relatively
modern. History traces the presence of a middle classes of merchants, guild
leaders, and state bureaucrats in the eighteenth century, who had access to better
education, more connections to the upper/ruling class, and better finances than
the majority of the working class (Hanna, 2003). However, the nuclei for the
modern Egyptian middle classes date back to the nineteenth century, when the
state sent students to Europe. Some of those students returned to form the
modern bureaucracy and educators, developing a new culture in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Lucie Ryzova (2014) dubbed this era “The Age
of Efendiyya”, who formed a new state-affiliated class formed in a manner
similar to the Mamluks in the thirteenth century, except that they were not
soldiers. This era established access to higher education as one of the pillars
defining middle classes in Egypt as an element of stand in Weber’s theory 5. This
era in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also established the
affiliation to the state and being part of its bureaucracy as another defining
feature for the middle classes of Egypt, a feature that was fully developed and
invested during the time of Nasser.
Historically, changes to Egypt’s economic and, consequently, social and
hierarchical structures have always been state-led and dominated. From

Education is still one of significant importance for the average Egyptian household.
According to CAPMAS report on the income and expenditure for the year 2019/2020,
average urban households spend 6.7% of their income on education. And total the number
of university graduates is steadily increasing, from about 340 thousand in 2016 to more than
480 thousand in 2020.

5
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Mohamed Ali’s modernization to the westernization by his grandson Ismail,
then the drastic shift to Socialism during the time of Nasser, then the other
extreme of Sadat’s open-door policy, the middle classes have always been the
subject of state economic actions. But for a brief time in the early twentieth
century, the educated class of leaders that became sophisticated at the time took
upon themselves the mission of creating an independent economy. According
to Tignor (1984), this class sought to use its wealth of land and other forms of
capital to diversify the economy and create a new layer of middle classes that
was independent of the state between 1918 and until Nasser’s time in 1952. This
newly established economy, and consequently the rise of the middle classes it
supported, was part of the decolonization and nationalist sentiment that was
sweeping the country at the time, adding an element of the party (as a pillar of
social stratification in Weber’s theory) to defining this new stratum of the
middle classes. While Egypt was under British mandate, the Egyptian business
elite tried to resist the favoritism of European counterparts by creating a national
economy that depended on resources that the latter did not have strong ties to;
mainly land and access to human capital, hence supporting the rise of the
independent middle classes (Tignor, 1984).
Nasser’s Middle Class
The element of the party in social stratification was massively
significant in the two decades following the 1952 coup in Egypt, as the new
regime adopted policies and narratives that were focused on decolonization and
cracking down on the corrupt elite of the monarchy alike. The economic
conditions during the 1930s and 1940s came in handy to support such a
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nationalist narrative, as the Egyptian economy was massively hit by the interwar and World War II eras. Being tied to the international economy, Egypt
relied much on the exports of cotton, which “commanded high prices on the
world market” (Tignor, 1984, 79) and, in turn, supported the introduction of
supporting industries and improvements to transportation, most significantly
establishing the railway. This growing Egyptian economy that once relied on
crop exports, textile industry, and active trade and services during the war
became stagnant. Population increase, paired with increasing rates of
underemployment and unemployment, made Egyptians poorer. And the elite
that once was investing in the national economy that supported the rise of a new
layer of middle classes became troubled itself, trying to save its businesses.
Expectedly, fewer people had access to any form of education, let alone higher
education, which eroded much of the stand element that signified the thennewly emerging middle classes. The 1952 regime was aware of the significance
of the element of education and used it efficiently to expand the middle classes
and strengthen its loyalty to the state. Huge investments were poured into all
stages of education, making the “educational effort of the interwar years
dwarfed by the Nasser Push of the 1950s and 1960s” (Tignor, 1984, 250).
Enrolment in primary education made a huge leap, from an enrolment rate of 45
percent among children of eligible age in 1952 to 65 percent in 1960, then 80
percent in 1967, counting for 3.4 million pupils. Investment in higher education
significantly increased as well, as “between 1953-1954 and 1961-1962, the
budget of the universities has almost quadrupled, whereas the budget of the
Ministry of Education little more than doubled” (Faksh, 1980, 48). And the
number of enrolled university students “rose from 35,016 undergraduates
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(excluding al-Azhar and the American University) in 1951-1952 to 86,539 in
1960-1961. It rose to 152,382 in 1970-1971” (Faksh, 1980, 46).
Investment in education was paired with another investment in the labor
market by promising job opportunities to the majority of the population,
especially university graduates. Given Egypt’s aforementioned ties to the global
economy, inter and post-world wars recession hit many industries in Egypt, and
the once-wealthy vibrant market became stagnant, leaving many workers and
employees under the threat of unemployment (Beinin, 1989). Nasser’s regime
used this momentum to declare a national goal of securing employment for all
kinds of labor. Given that most businesses were nationalized and private
businesses were discouraged, the state became the main employer either in
public sector enterprises or state bureaucracy. One of the changes to the
employment market was to give priority to skilled workers while side-lining
non-skilled labor. In that sense, people of the lower-middle and poorer classes
got more interested in vocational education and training to become government
employees (Abdalla, 1984). As a result, “the number of government sector
workers was increased from 350,000 in 1951-1952 to 1.2 million in 1969-1970.
The annual growth rate of government sector workers was 7.5% between 1962
and 1972 and exceeded the annual growth rate (2.2%) of the national
workforce” (Kawamura, 2021, 36; Waterbury, 1983).
And with the rapidly increasing number of university graduates, the state
made a commitment to providing jobs to all university graduates in one of the
state enterprises or bureaucracies. In 1961, the government declared a five-year
plan to reform the public sector, with a bundle of decisions with regard to the
workforce, including one that mandates a guaranteed job to all university
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graduates (Waterbury, 1983). This guarantee was formalized into law 14 in
1964 and was expanded through law 85 in 1973 to include graduates of
vocational education (Assaad, 1997). As a result, the state bureaucracy kept
growing annually, sometimes unnecessarily, in a manner that surpassed its
capacity (Abdalla, 1984). “Over the Plan period, the workforce grew by nearly
22 percent, or from about 6 [in 1959] to 7.3 million [in 1965]” (Waterbury,
1983, 90). As a result, the public sector became overstaffed, and productivity
soon declined before the end of the Plan. The investment in education and
employment still served a great purpose by creating a huge stratum of middle,
lower-middle, and working classes that were state-affiliated, a strategy of
creating loyalty and exercising control and dominance at the same time
(Abdalla, 1984; Benin, 1989).
Changes to the Egyptian middle classes during the time of Nasser
surpassed the mere influx of funds to education and employment to other
demographic and occupational structures. Before 1952, the Egyptian social
stratification had an upper class of land owners, while the middle classes,
arguably, had two strata; one of rural intellectuals and merchants and another of
industrialists. After 1952, the regime sought to replace the industrialist strata
that was much associated with the upper class with that of the state-affiliated
bureaucratic and managerial elite (Abdalla 1984; Mellor, 2016). The military
was considered another tool of social mobility at the time since young men of
the upper and middle classes were not keen to join the army at the time, giving
more space to those of the rural and lower classes. And given the benefits,
finances, and connections (i.e., class, stand, and party) that were dedicated to
this group, it made its way up on the social stratification. This Nasserite
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investment in the middle classes paid off decades later; as Galal Amin (1991)
states that the Egyptian population in 1955 constituted 19 percent of the middle
classes, 80 percent of the lower classes, and one percent of the upper class. In
1986, the numbers grew to around 45 percent of the middle classes, 50 percent
of the lower classes, and five percent of the upper class (Amin, 1991, 70, 72).
This increase in the numbers of the middle classes during the 1950s and 1960s
was accompanied by demographic changes as well, as social mobility elevated
many people from the poorer/lower to middle classes thanks to education and
affiliation to state bureaucracy, paired with the fall of some of the members of
the upper class to the middle classes and being replaced by new state elite and
bourgeoisie (Mellor, 2015).
Sadat’s Open-door Policy
The expansion of the middle classes made it more heterogenous, given
the diverse backgrounds of each stratum. This diversity grew rather deeper after
Sadat’s open-door policy in the 1970s. While the middle classes were
previously defined by their state affiliation, non-ownership of production
capital, yet possession of huge social capital in terms of access to education and
networks (i.e., elements of stand and party) (Mellor, 2015), the open-door policy
disrupted this order by introducing liberal policies that resulted in a new wave
of social mobility. The working/lower class that was once poorer and less
educated could make more income and enjoyed higher living standards in
comparison to the state-employed middle classes, but it was still lacking the
social capital of education and networks.
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Sadat’s open-door policy was determined to support the flow of money
and private investment into the country, sometimes at the expense of Nasser's
huge public sector and bureaucracy apparatus. “However, this economic growth
did not bestow upon Egypt the development of ‘real’ economy; instead, it
accelerated the decline of it” (DAI, 2012, 67). But this toll on the public sector
was not intended. According to Kawamura (2022), Sadat sought to preserve
Nasser’s public sector structure to gather and maintain the political support of
the middle classes. The guaranteed job scheme was expanded, and 60 percent
of the university graduates sought employment in the public sector by the late
1970s. Enrolment in universities kept expanding as well, making an increase by
3.5 times between 1971 and 1984, besides launching seven new provincial
universities between 1972 and 1976 (Kawamura, 2022). This investment in
education was not only driven by Sadat’s approach to maintaining the public
sector but also by the new international and domestic political and economic
orders. After the 1973 war, Sadat shifted from Nasser’s socialist policies to
more liberal ones to elevate the Egyptian economy. Foreign investments and the
private sector were encouraged, creating more jobs and more demand for higher
education and the kind of training and skills that university graduates have
(Waterbury, 1983). Consequently, a new stratum within the middle classes was
created from the private sector employees and small businesses owners, who
enjoyed better income and more privileges in comparison to their public sector
counterparts.
The oil boom in the Gulf was yet another big change in the international
economy that coincided with Sadat’s Open Door. It sparked the need for all
kinds of labor in the Gulf countries, whether nonskilled or skilled workers,
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professionals, university graduates, and postgraduates. Sadat’s liberal policies
allowed, and even encouraged, big waves of labor migration from all classes. In
the Egyptian villages, it became a phenomenon for laborers to travel and leave
the village behind and send money back to their families. This flow of
remittance resulted in a new wave of social mobility by being used to improve
“living standards and housing, security of retirement or for building up a certain
prestige in their home areas. Economic investment is not a predominant feature.
In many cases, migrant workers are able to save substantial amounts of money”
(Reichert, 1993, 43). Migration also disrupted the long-established relationship
between land ownership and social classes in rural Egypt, as a new layer in the
rural middle classes came into existence through migration monetary flows.
Meanwhile, the state was burdened by maintaining the huge public
sector, and “as early as 1973, various Egyptians began to call for the liquidation
of failing public sector enterprises” (Waterbury,1983, 138). Multiple plans were
proposed to handle the losses of the public sector, including sacking the
unwanted labor and employees and selling shares from the state capital to the
private sector, especially as the economic situation got really sore during the
war years. And in 1976, a five-year plan (1976-1980) was announced, and it
included listing 16 industrial companies to sell their shares to the private sector
for 50 million Egyptian Pounds (Waterbury, 1983). As a result, the middle
classes that were once affiliated with state employment became increasingly
short of financial capabilities and were pushed towards lower-middle and
lower/poorer strata, in a classic case of social vulnerability as discussed earlier
in the literature (Mallick and Rafi, 2010; Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2014;
Stampini et al., 2016). It was plausible for this vulnerability to continue during
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the time of Mubarak, where the shrinkage of the state apparatus became rather
fiercer during the consecutive waves of privatization of the public sector.
Mubarak Era
Mubarak’s privatization was paired with two major changes in the
international political and economic structures, which are the rise of the oil-rich
economies in neighboring Gulf countries and the transition to a uni-polar world
system controlled by the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union (DAI,
2012). Labor migration to the oil-rich countries played a role as well in
diversifying the backgrounds within each class, as it resulted in a huge wave of
social mobility from middle to upper and from poorer to middle classes in terms
of income. This labor migration “absorbed the growing Egyptian labor force
(skilled and semi-skilled) while increasing remittances at a remarkable rate:
from USD 2 billion in 1980 to approximately USD 9 billion in 2011.” (Mellor,
2016, 64).
On the other hand, the consecutive liberal economic policies imposed
by the new international order made it harder for the public sector to survive,
and the private sector took over, changing both the economic and social
ecosystems. According to DAI (2012), the older form of the upper and middle
classes was restructured into the structure that still exists. A new upper class
emerged, consisting of foreign and new national capitalists and business elite
besides the old elite. The new lower class consisted mostly of labor and workers
in both the public and private sectors or other sorts of informal employment.
Public sector and bureaucracy employees made their way down the social
stratification, arguably creating what we know now as the vulnerable/lower
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middle classes (Roque, 2020). Consequently, the social gap significantly
expanded, creating a bigger upper class, a much bigger lower class, and
shrinking, struggling middle classes. By 2006 “the upper class accounted for
18.4%, the middle classes 12.4%, and the lower class 69.1%” (DAI, 2012, 70).
In Comparison to figures quoted earlier in this chapter by Gala Amin (1991),
the middle classes shrank from 45 percent in 1991 to 12.4 percent within 15
years, which resonates with the vulnerability approach referred to earlier in the
literature review. Hasan (2016), however, challenges the notion of shrinkage of
the Egyptian middle classes and argues that it has rather been restructured into
new layers. While the liberal economic policies have indeed resulted in
shrinkage of the state-affiliated middle classes and pushed parts of it into the
poorer thresholds of the social stratification, it created in return new layers and
professions that did not exist before. These new modes of employment, like
small businesses, the working class that receives a middle classes income, selfemployment, and wage recipient labor, were excluded from middle classes
count and research (Hasan, 2016). Accordingly, Hasan points out that the
positions of the middle classes increased in size from 36.63 percent in 1976 to
55.1 percent in 1996 (Hasan, 2016, 94). A setback happened, however, between
1996 and 2006, as the percentage of the middle classes declined to 41 percent,
“which is expected and plausible in light of state policies and programs that
dismantled some of the middle classes’ positions and redistributed them into
other placements in the class stratification, most significantly the working class.
Policies towards labor laws, waves of privatization, selling the public sector and
encouraging the private one, all contributed to cutting off some main streams
that helped the middle classes to grow socially and demographically” (Hasan,
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2016, 95). As these policies kept expanding, the layer of the middle classes
associated with the public sector kept shrinking, and by 2018 the public sector
counted for only 18 percent of the employment in Egypt (Tansel et al., 2020).
Subscribing Weber’s theory on class stratification is significant here,
given that the economic changes over the previous eras created multiple layers
within the same social group. It is irrational to exclude layers based on the level
of income that might have increased or lost value while they still belong in terms
of ideology and social capital. Therefore, elements of stand and party remain
substantial to identify the Egyptian middle classes.
The new liberal economic order totally reconstructed the middle classes
to include professionals, administration employees, owners of medium private
businesses, and most of the shopkeepers. It also created layers within the middle
classes, splitting it into the upper-middle class of households who work as
professionals, earn a relatively higher income, own a car or two, live in
relatively improved residential areas but cannot afford luxurious gated
communities, can afford to pay for domestic help and have access to private and
international education. As the economic situation gets tighter, this group cuts
mainly the luxurious, leisure, and non-essential goods and services. The second
layer is that of middle-class households who are also professionals but earn less
income, live in more congested neighborhoods, can afford private education but
not an international one, and is less capable of consuming goods and services in
comparison to their upper-middle counterparts, hence their need to make more
cuts to the non-essential goods and adjust their consumption of the essentials
(Roque, 2020). The third layer is the lower-middle class, consisting of
households that are barely capable of sustaining themselves above the poverty
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line, live in modest neighborhoods, homes have basic appliances, have no
budget for luxuries and leisure, struggle to keep up with the cost of the
essentials, have less budget for private education and resort to national schools
with relatively higher fees or nunnery ones (Roque, 2020).
In Weber’s terms, this era resulted in the emergence of a new layer
within each social group in the stratification of the Egyptian society, and this
new layer was not necessarily identical in the financial aspect (i.e., class) and
arguably lacked the previously assigned elements of stand and party. As a result,
heterogenicity got even deeper within each social group, especially as the
political backgrounds became more diversified, being Marxist/Nasserite,
Liberal under Sadat while allowing more presence to the Islamists starting in
the 1970s.
Lifestyle and Moral Traits
The changes to the economic structures and rapid social mobility
changed the lifestyle and consumption habits of the growing middle classes in
Egypt, where the open-door and liberal economic policies and the increasing
influx of finances from foreign investments and labor migration made more
imported goods available and more taste and ability to consume them. The
change in consumption habits is also argued to be one of the consequences of
social mobility, as an attempt by the people of the new stratum to cover up their
real class origin (Amin, 2000). By the late 1990s, the new layers of the middle
classes lost most of their dependency and affiliation to the state in both income
(employment by the public sector) and consumption. Upper layers of the middle
classes consumed less subsidized or locally produced goods, were introduced to
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a westernized lifestyle of dining (which was exclusively a trait of upper classes
in previous eras), subscribed to private education and healthcare services, had
increasing access to sports and social clubs and enjoyed a new culture of leisure
that used to be exclusive to upper classes like dining out and traveling for
holidays (Abaza, 2006). However, the new lifestyle (an element of stand in
Weber’s terms) was rather demanding and meant that as the economic
conditions got tighter, people of this class had more to keep up with than they
were used to before.
The shifts in economic structures have historically had the biggest toll
on the middle classes, financially and morally. According to Galal Amin (2012),
the middle classes enjoyed traits of stability, education, morals, and respect for
the law, in addition to a rational view of religious and patriotic sentiment,
making this class a safeguard against corruption at various times in modern
Egyptian history. Yet, the tightening economic situation paired with the rapid
social mobility in the late Sadat and during the Mubarak era changed most of
those moral traits. The height of this change was during the Mubarak era,
though, where “the rapid rate of population growth, combined with insufﬁcient
economic growth and the slackening of labor migration, plus the resulting rise
in unemployment and the growth of slums were all powerful enough motivators
for people to circumvent the law.” (Amin, 2012, 42). And towards the end of
the Mubarak era, social mobility got even slower, and the middle classes got
more vulnerable to falling into the poorer ones, which compromised its
historically celebrated patriotic sentiment.
Given the aforementioned circumstances, it was a matter of time before
the middle classes took to the streets of Egypt in 2011, not only making
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economic demands like in 1974, for instance, but also demanding social,
political, and economic reform. Hazem Kandil (2012) argues that the middle
classes were severely suffering financially in the presence of an expanding
consumer culture that they, as well as the government, were not able to keep up
with. And thanks to the awareness this class enjoyed due to education; they
believed that in the presence of the business elite in power, “the worst was yet
to come” (Kandil, 2012). The moral traits that Galal Amin described were
significant, even in the act of revolt in 2011, dubbed by Jessica Winegar (2016)
as a “civilized revolution”. She argues in her article that the education and moral
values that the middle Classes are associated with made the 18 days of Tahrir
Square “aesthetic” in terms of slogans, chants, organization, banners, unifying
outfits, and colors of clothing in some protests, as well as the rise of the art of
graffiti. All this, according to Winegar (2016), created a state of Utopia that the
young people of the middle classes were aspiring to, and the patriotic sentiment
(which was once compromised, according to Amin) was reinstated. However,
this revolutionary romance was perhaps the reason why the revolting young
people were distracted from the political reality, hence had their revolution
compromised. And with the constant political and economic disappointments, a
paradox was created where the morals of the middle classes lost precedence,
and people resorted to “verbal vulgarity previously more common among the
lower classes to express views about the political situation” (Winegar, 2016,
620).
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Women of the Middle Classes
The traits that define the middle classes’ morals and lifestyle extend to
the situation of women, most notably gender roles and the public and social
space available for them to navigate. While women of the middle classes enjoy
an improved legal, educational, and employment status, this improvement
remains compromised by the gender roles that did not similarly change.
Multiple factors can be attributed to this situation, “including women’s
occupational segregation, the intensification of their domestic burdens, the
contraction of opportunities in the public sector leading to overcrowding in the
limited segments of the private sector that are accessible to women” (Assaad
and Arntz, 2005, 432) Most women of the Egyptian middle classes fail to make
proper use of their higher education and acquired degrees for the purpose of
employment, where women’s share of the labor market remained well below 30
percent (Binzel and Assaad, 2011). In many cases, the degree only serves as a
tool to elevate marriage prospects, as the role of a housewife and mother takes
precedence over a career. Even in households where women are required to
work in order to support financially, conventional gender roles remain enforced,
which compromises women’s professional prospects and wellbeing (Roque,
2020). Mervat Hatem (1988) blames the rise of Islamist groups and the
patriarchal nationalist sentiment for the imbalanced gender roles and traces it
back to intellectuals of the first quarter of the twentieth century, who, instead of
promoting a westernized/modernized culture of equality, advocated that “more
accurate interpretations of Islam supported the extension of equal rights to
women.” (Hatem, 1988, 412). Consequently, the patriarchal/conservative
system remained in control, and women had to accept it in exchange for
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improving their chances of education and public space. And while the socialist
trend in the 1960s tried to promote more integration of women in the public
space and employment, the rise of Islamist groups in the 1970s acted as a sit
back. They heavily promoted the domestic role as the sole purpose of women’s
life, education being a tool to make them better housewives and mothers, and
advocated against their employment (Hatem, 1988). Sadat’s regime seemed to
be in line with this narrative, but the difficult economic situation served in favor
of middle classes women in this instance despite its toll on the middle classes
in general. “Most analysts agree that spiraling inflation made two-income
families an economic necessity, therefore making it difficult for the state to
withdraw its commitment to the employment of women” (Hatem, 1988, 415).
Labor migration in the 1970s was yet another factor that influenced
women’s employment, both in rural and urban communities. Being maledominated labor migration, women were left behind, fully responsible for the
households, and financially dependent on remittance. Thus, the migration phase
was closely tied to the phase of marriage, where young men traveled mainly to
earn the needed marriage expenses and support their new families (Binzel and
Assaad, 2011). As a result, women’s share in the household responsibilities got
even bigger, having to compensate for the absence of the partner by taking over
more domestic duties and non-paid work and compensating for men’s absence
in the labor market. But the effect was rather stronger in the urban contexts
where “unlike the case of family farms, where many tasks can be carried out by
men or women, family enterprises in urban areas tend to operate according to a
much stricter gender division of labor and men are much more likely to be
engaged in wage work anyway. It is therefore more difficult for women to
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substitute for the labor of the absent migrant in urban areas” (Binzel and Assaad,
2011, 105). Moreover, the emerging private sector in the 1970s was not as
welcoming or convenient for women as the public sector, given the familial
commitments (Assaad and Arntz, 2005; Tansel et al., 2020). As a result,
women’s chances in the private sector were fewer in comparison to men and a
salary gap came to exist given that “unlike in the government, where married
women are more able to reconcile their marital responsibilities with their work
duties, marriage and the added responsibilities it entails appears to be
incompatible with nongovernmental wage and salary employment in Egypt”
(Assaad and Arntz, 2005, 439).
Roque’s research (2020) found that cultural, religious, and economic
influences hinder highly educated middle Classes women’s participation in
formal employment, mainly due to their belief in “the greater strength and
significance of the marriage market compared to that of the labor market”
(Roque, 2020, 13). Accordingly, higher education of at least a university degree
is merely a symbol of social status among middle classes women and is linked
to improving their marital prospects. The need for financial security is ranked
second, depending on the financial situation of the households that women are
married into. And given that the surrounding social pressure gives primacy to
women’s role as housewives and mothers, without any change to domestic
gender roles, plus the demanding private sector having the bigger share of
employment, women’s chance of finding appropriate and decent jobs was
greatly affected (Roque, 2020). In such context, education and the need for work
serve as elements of stand in Weber’s terms, rather than their initial purpose as
elements of class/income.
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Cultural and social restrictions have also affected the public space
available for middle classes women, who chose to resort to controlled spaces as
a haven from the increasingly dangerous public spaces in the streets and
transportation (de Konning, 2009; Roque, 2020). Such controlled places include
modern coffee shops, restaurants, social and sports clubs, and areas that best
cater to their roles as mothers and housewives. De Konning (2009) finds these
havens to be part of the gendered class divide in Cairo and similar Egyptian
urban communities, as the social and economic restructuring of the class system
created a new middle/upper-middle classes that adopt a different/more
westernized set of morals. The public and social space available to women come
at the heart of this new moral system, which might not necessarily be to the
liking of the greater masses from other classes, hence the need for controlled
spaces for these women to socialize. This situation, however, created a new set
of inequalities; firstly, it makes it harder for women to socialize, sometimes
having to commute for long distances to places that can be presumed safe or
decent. Secondly, it is a more costly lifestyle than men from the same social
group/class, who could easily access cheaper and more public places without
restrictions or concerns. And finally, it compromises women’s space and
rightful presence in the streets, transportation, and public spaces, leaving issues
like sexual harassment and violence against women unresolved (de Konning,
2009). This, in turn, affects other women from poorer or lower-middle classes,
who do not necessarily have the means to afford those confined spaces and have
to endure the dangers or handle them in other ways. The gendered class
segregation and dynamics of handling social spaces resonate with Bispinar’s
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research (2010) on women in urban Turkey, proving the existence of a class
divide in agency, practices, and perceptions of empowerment.
To sum up, the current Egyptian middle classes are a product of rapid
and significant changes over a relatively short span of history. Changes from
being an elite investment to state-affiliated, then state-independent brought
about changes to the social, moral, and consumer cultures and structures of this
social group. However, elements of stand remain more or less the same; access
to higher education, ability to consume, having some budget for luxuries, and
affordability of private services. While women of this group became
increasingly required to contribute to the household’s welfare, the traditional
gender roles that place domestic burdens on women remained in place.
Similarly, restrictions on women’s access to public spaces and freedom of
movement did not equally change, which compromises many aspects of the
empowerment of this group of women.
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Chapter 5: Economic Empowerment and Social Disempowerment

The outcome of this research proved part of the hypothesis and
disproved another. In line with the hypothesis, participants were found to be
financially empowered under the new economic measures in terms of access to
jobs, sources of income, and having control over their own finances. Yet,
against the hypothesis, women were not found to be equally empowered
socially, where the social norms and household dynamics did not change much
under the new circumstances. In addition, women suffered from the double
burden and time poverty in a way that further hindered their practice of social
empowerment.
Economic Empowerment
The majority of the participants were found to be financially empowered
in the sense that they have stable jobs, earn fixed salaries, exercise much control
over their income, are much involved in the financial decisions of the family,
and have the required skills to place them in the job market. Even those who
practiced this kind of empowerment before could still find it after the economic
measures were implemented. For example, Sarah, an upper-middle class who
used to be a housewife and stay-at-home mother for ten years, could find a job
as a school teacher in 2018 as the need arose for an additional source of income
for the family. Same for Gameela, the upper-middle class construction engineer
who stayed at home for five years, could land a job in late 2021 to secure the
school fees of her younger daughter. Also, Mayar, an upper-middle class mother
who worked for about four years as a freelance media producer, could finally
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land a fixed job as a media officer in 2019, around the time when she needed a
fixed income to contribute to her son’s school fees.
Vulnerable empowerment
This empowerment, however, is vulnerable and could be compromised
due to multiple factors; the inability to get their financial role fully
acknowledged and identified in the household, the sore economic situation in
the country that makes it harder to self-develop hence acquire more skills or
better jobs, and belonging to their respective social groups which act as a
support system in some instances and a burden in others.
The acknowledgment of the economic role of women in the household,
either through direct financial contribution or non-paid housework, has always
been an issue of concern in the literature (Bispinar, 2010; Périvier, 2016;
Bayissa et al., 2018). And the risk of unacknowledging women’s contribution
was evident through my research since, among the seven women in co-headed
households I interviewed, five stated that their husbands are the main
breadwinners in the family. Salma, for instance, a middle-class teacher who
contributes her full salary towards the household supplies (counts for a quarter
of the household income as she estimates), believes that her husband is the
breadwinner and that her contribution is just and extra. Same for Sarah, who
admitted that her low salary does not make her a breadwinner, despite her being
in full control over the finances of the household and doing extra housework
and chores to substitute for the goods and services they no longer afford to
consume. Mariana, and upper-middle class journalist, earns a more stable and
consistent income in comparison to her husband, who runs a business of media
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services, yet believes that her husband is the main breadwinner because he earns
more money in the greater scheme.
However, the cases of Gameela and Heba are the most evident in this
regard because, despite the great contribution they provide, they do not
acknowledge themselves as co-breadwinners. Gameela has a commitment to
paying the school expenses of her second daughter plus providing for her
personal expenses, which is a great contribution that constitutes almost half of
the annual household expenses. Heba, a middle-class banker, also made a great
contribution by providing the sole source of income for the household when her
husband lost his job in 2020, and later by providing the bigger share of income
when the only jobs he found provided monthly salaries of 1000-2000 Egyptian
Pounds. That said, none of the interviewed women in co-headed households
acknowledged or was even aware that her non-paid housework is actually a
worthy contribution to the finances of the households. For instance, Salma and
Sarah said that they do more housework, cooking, and chores and use the help
of female domestic workers much less vis a vis before the measures were placed
in order to save money, but this was not considered a financial contribution. As
presented earlier in the literature (Bispinar, 2010; Périvier, 2016; Bayissa et al.,
2018; Roque, 2020), these are classical cases of double-burden that women bear
during times of austerity, which passes without proper acknowledgment,
sometimes by the women themselves.
Decision-making Dynamics
This denial of the magnitude of the economic role of the participants
was reflected in the decision-making dynamics within the households. In the
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case of Salma, she admitted that her husband had the bigger and final say with
regard to the financial decision of the family and that she could not contest these
dynamics even if she wanted. Gameela, however, did not feel it was reflected
in the decision-making dynamics in the family as much as giving the husband
more financial liberties. A hypothetical example she gave was her husband
making the abrupt decision to purchase a gaming console for 20 thousand
Egyptian pounds, which she found would be much more socially acceptable by
the extended family because it is considered his money at the end of the day.
This same example is not equally perceived when it comes to her own finances,
as Gameela acknowledged that she could not make such big decisions of
purchase on her own, even if it were her money, “without prior consultation at
least”. On the other hand, in the cases of Sarah and Mayar, men have willingly
given up much of their say over the finances of the family due to issues of
proximity or in exchange for greater liberties. Sarah had the full and utmost
control over the finances of her family due to the absence of her husband, the
army officer. She makes decisions regarding her son’s education, activities,
household expenses, and even the bigger ones of moving houses and buying a
car. Same for Mayar, who makes the daily decisions of the household totally
independent from her husband as he works for late hours. She also has a great
share when it comes to bigger financial decisions, like buying a car or taking a
loan, or deciding on the finances of her son’s education and activities.
These findings prove part of the hypothesis and disprove another, in the
sense that while women are financially empowered in terms of having access to
income, the patriarchal pattern that controls their household dynamics gives the
upper hand to men, places limitations on their freedom to make decisions and
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makes them disempowered socially. Consequently, this pattern places risks on
the sustainability of the financial empowerment of women. That said, it echoes
the concerns presented earlier in the literature review about the element of
agency over financial resources being as significant in assessing empowerment
as the access to the resources. Women might own the assets or income but are
still bound by a culture that necessitates using them for certain expenses or
under male consultation, if not permission (Buvinić and Gupta, 1997; Horrell
and Krishnan, 2008; Al-Dajani and Marlow, 2013; Bayissa et al., 2017;
Sharaunga et al., 2018; Roque, 2020). Although the majority of the participants
said that they have an equal say in the financial decision-making of the
household, the cases of Gameela and Salma are still proof of the vulnerability
of the financial empowerment of women under the traditional household
dynamics. As presented earlier in the literature, Roque (2020) finds that this
pattern results from the endurance of a culture that places a bigger emphasis on
women’s roles as wives and mothers and makes their role in the household more
worthy socially than in the job market. It is true that all the seven women in the
co-headed households made the conscious and independent choice of
contributing their financial resources to the household income out of the sense
of duty or motherly instinct to support their children, but this contribution in
both its forms (financial and housework) has to be acknowledged to safeguard
this empowerment.
Economic Insecurity
The sore economic situation is yet another element that compromises
the empowerment of most of the participants. While the austerity and need for
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extra income had a positive consequence by pushing Gameela, Mayar and Sarah
to get stable employment, hence an independent source of income, economic
hardships and instability still deeply hinder participants’ ability to control their
finances and consequently feel financially safe and empowered. This has been
brutally proven in the case of Laila, the single mother of two who was pushed
down to the lower-middle class, as she and her daughters suffered a huge toll
after the floatation of the Egyptian currency in 2016, especially since she was
already in debt to meet her responsibilities. For about two months after the
floatation in 2016, Laila could not afford to buy proper food, just beans, cheese,
and bread. She described the situation as very stressful, as she sometimes felt
thankful her kids got tired and slept early, which meant skipping a meal. She
stated that she “did not feel empowered at all” and eventually had to find a job
in a gulf country and be separated from her children for more than a year to pay
off her debts.
Radwa, is yet another brutal example, coming from an already
financially troubled lower-middle class family due to her father’s disability, and
being a fresh graduate who has limited opportunities and is hired for small
salaries that are not enough to support her household. She had to change jobs
multiple times, as the only jobs offered were fixed-term contracts and for
salaries as low as 800 Egyptian Pounds. Consequently, she had to sell any
valuables that might bring a considerable amount of money, like gold jewelry
and her personal laptop. She also had to make severe changes to household
consumption, like cutting off meat and poultry and reducing the variety and
amount of groceries they consume. Similarly, for Hend, who made her way
down from an upper-middle class family to middle-class, empowerment is
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compromised by economic hardships that make her sometimes unable to afford
basic needs such as seeing doctors for her chronic illness. She stated that she
started a meal schedule after the economic measures were enforced in order to
handle the messed-up budget of her household. These experiences can be
summed up in Sarah’s words, stating that she does not feel in control of her
finances; rather, finances control her and the way she lives. After enforcing the
austerity measures, this sore economic situation pushed Gameela, Heba, Salma,
Hend, and Laila to use their savings or liquidate assets to afford their basic needs
and maintain their lifestyle. And in the pursuit of maintaining a livelihood, none
of the participants could make any savings to secure their financial future. And
the two who did, naming Hend and Heba, used these savings later to pay for
bigger financial commitments. Some commitments are personal, like Hend
having to pay for her medical needs or the household, like Heba having to
support her family and pay for her son’s education.
Self-development
In addition to the compromised finances, most of the participants did not
see any prospect of gaining training or education that might secure better jobs
or additional sources of income. Esraa, Mariana, Heba, Sarah, Radwa, and
Gameela stated that it is very costly for them to pay for a course in languages
or any certification in their respective fields. Esraa, for example, said she had to
stop taking classes in Arabic writing because it was burdening her budget, and
she could not afford to take other courses that help her with other skills. Same
for Heba, who thought of learning Russian to give her an edge in serving the
bank customers but had to put off the idea due to the cost. Sarah and Mariana

69

could not enroll in a master’s degree and diplomas due to the financial
commitment, which Mariana called “an unaffordable investment”. In the case
of Gameela, engineering certification is not just a one-off payment but rather a
running cost of renewals, all of which are in foreign currency. And as the
Egyptian Pound keeps losing value to other currencies, she puts off taking a
couple of certificates and prefers to keep the money for her daughters’
education. Others, like Mayar, work in places willing to allocate budget or
directly provide necessary training and courses for the staff, which creates an
attachment to the place. And in this regard, Mayar believes that the sore
economic situation made her develop a bigger attachment to her workplace,
being more concerned about the stability and security in her job instead of
pursuing other less stable jobs, even if they are better paid. Yet, in a case like
Esraa, she stated that the economic situation affected the budget allocated for
training in her work; an example was training she kept requesting for three years
until she left in December 2020 and never got to take it. The outcome of such a
lack of training opportunities can be seen in the older participants, Salma and
Laila, who have no prospects to move to better places and are barely trying to
find a good place to retire. Salma is content with her government job in
education management and does not really care to explore elsewhere. And Laila
has seen younger talents take over her place at work, with no consideration for
the element of experience, and “the idea of the end/retirement” took over her.
Social Privileges and Burdens
The stand element was proven to be both of assistance and burden in
different instances. For all the participants, belonging to their classes was the
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main factor that helped them position themselves in their respective careers and
lifestyles. Some of them still keep aspects of their privileges through the support
of ‘the stand’, like Gameela, who lives in a building owned by her in-laws, so
she does not pay rent, housing installments, or utility bills. Similarly, Hend lives
in an apartment in Heliopolis owned by her mother, so she lives in a
middle/upper-middle classes neighborhood without having to afford it. And
Sarah’s husband’s belonging to his profession (i.e., element of party) enabled
her to move houses when her old place got ruined and less serviced, even when
it was financially challenging, just because he had access to neighborhoods
dedicated to army officers.
On the other hand, the element of stand poses other challenges to
preserving the lifestyle that makes participants belong to their classes. Among
those challenges is sending children to schools similar to that of their peers,
where Gameela, Mayar, and Sarah (all upper-middle class), said it is important
for them to send their children to schools that provide good/international
education despite all the financial toll. Also, paying for activities and sports
training for children “has become an [social] obligation and not a choice, unlike
in our generation” as Mayar puts it, she also states that not taking a kid to any
sports training is considered odd among her peers. Same for Laila, who kept the
share of income dedicated to school instalments untouched, despite the brutal
changes made to needs as basic as food. In fact, all participants agreed that
public education was not an option for their children, despite the fact that the
majority of them had public education. They all agreed that the community they
want for their children cannot be found in public schools, and that the
significance of schools is not only in the kind of education, but includes
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activities and social position. Roque (2020) made the same notion in her
research, stating that each stratum within the middle classes sent its children to
private education, which resulted in having different types of private schools
and universities according to the affordability of each group. That said, all
participants made changes to their consumption behavior in terms of food
supplies and clothing but were very keen to keep elements of socializing like
certain schools or social and sports clubs. Similarly, for Mariana, belonging to
and growing up in her social classes places a burden on her affordability to the
lifestyle, like going out in certain places or consuming certain brands, and
seeing all that slipping away as the financial situation gets tighter creates fear
and panic in her social group.
To sum up, as hypothesized, participants in this research were found to
be economically empowered in terms of the ability to find jobs, generate
income, and exercise significant control over their income and household
finances. Yet this empowerment is compromised and not sustainable as their
financial contribution is not significantly recognized, sometimes even by
themselves, due to the culture and social norms that give men the upper hand
over the finances of the household. As will be explained later, these norms are
a factor that disempowers women socially and poses a risk to their financial
empowerment. It resonates with the multidisciplinary assessment of
empowerment explained earlier in this research, given that economic
empowerment cannot be excluded from the social and community contexts.
While women have the opportunity to work and generate income, the norms
that govern their social context are still patriarchal, give more significance to
women’s roles as housewives and mothers, and even affect their job
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opportunities and decisions to use income (Assaad and Arntz, 2013; Roque,
2020). There is also uncertainty about the participants’ prospects in the job
market, in light of the sustainability of the businesses they work for and their
inability to better develop their skills to maintain an edge in the job market.
Lastly, the element of stand poses itself in determining the financial decisions
of the participants and their households in a way that compromises their
finances and burdens them sometimes.
Social Empowerment
While the majority of the participants were found to be economically
empowered, they were not found to be as socially empowered in terms of their
ability to make personal and family choices and decisions, ability to pursue
ambitions and develop careers and characters, access to social life (friendships,
family and activities) and freedom to move in and between different places to
get errands done or for leisure. Many limitations are imposed on participants’
ability to form and maintain relationships, move around freely and have free
time for their wellbeing. Some of these limitations are related to the familial
circumstances of each participant. Others are related to social norms or as a
direct result of financial hardships.
Intuitively, women who did not have children or had older children
enjoyed relatively more social freedoms. Esraa, for instance, stated that she had
much time to read, enjoy her activities or meet up with friends in her free time.
Similarly, despite working for two places, Hend is still capable of seeing her
friends and maintaining constant contact almost daily. And Salma, whose three
children are off to universities, can find some time in the middle or at the end
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of the day for herself. On the other hand, participants with younger children
(Gameela, Mayar, Heba, and Sarah) suffer from absolute time poverty, having
their time divided among work, house chores, and kids’ training and activities.
Gameela, for instance, did not have time to spare at home to do the interview
for this research, and the only slot available was during her commute from work.
Similarly, Mayar and Heba stated that their only “me time” was the break they
had at work, as they did not get to have any time for themselves at home. All of
the four women stated that they did not have time to do any activities for their
own leisure, like seeing friends or visiting a beauty salon, and the only
socializing they did was with mothers of other children during training or in
school. Another cause of time poverty, like in the case of Laila, was being
overworked, where she had to finish a shift of nine hours and work as a
freelancer for extra five hours to afford to live.
Social Norms and Judgments
Social norms place many limitations on women’s freedom to move, visit
certain places or socialize, or make personal choices, especially in comparison
to men (Hatem, 1988; de Konning, 2009; Roque, 2020). All participants stated
that they felt it is socially acceptable, and sometimes mandated, that men have
more opportunities to make decisions on their own and break away from
responsibilities and that “the society gives validation to men who want to be
irresponsible,” as Sarah puts it. And that was evident in the case of Mayar as
well, who said that it had become the status quo that she takes over most of the
household and the kid’s responsibilities, even if her husband has the time.
Participants also quoted being judged by their community over their compliance
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to social norms and dynamics as a threat to their social empowerment both
inside and outside of the households. Things like the number of hours they
spend outside, their working hours, places they go to, how they are dressed, and
choices of friends were subject to social judgment and pressure among all
participants. Gameela even mentioned that she was judged by her extended
family and some friends over the division of labor in her household as she asked
her husband to help with the kids when she started to work. In Hend’s case, the
judgment had a bigger toll as she fell out with her brother for making the choice
of taking off her hijab. He, in return, cut her off and refused to attend her
wedding. She also stated that with every family gathering, she’s burdened by
comments about her choices for life, her divorce, and her looks. Similarly,
Mariana finds that her community has become more concerned and judging
about her lifestyle, as everybody keeps an eye on the kind of life others lead,
their clothing, whether they buy branded products, the types of cars they drive,
and other aspects of lifestyle.
These social judgments often extend to how women are perceived in
their workplace, where Gameela has to fight being undermined at work every
day, especially since she works in a career that’s perceived to be maledominated. She finds it to be exhausting to have to be assertive all the time with
her colleagues and yell at the construction workers she manages in order to be
listened to. In other words, the social norm that makes her profession a maledominated one makes it harder for her to maintain her rightful place in her
career. These workplace perceptions took another turn for Radwa, being
harassed by a manager who wanted to take advantage of her young age and need
for work and eventually sacked her. These situations were reversed in careers
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that are perceived to be female-dominated, like administrative and
communications in the case of Mayar or teaching in the cases of Sarah and
Salma.
Mobility and Public Space
Given the aforementioned limitations to women’s public and
professional spaces, the toll of sexual harassment was found to be socially
disempowering to all of the participants. All ten women pay the extra cost and
extra time to ensure their safety while in the streets or workplaces. Radwa stated
that she was harassed in public transportation and decided, despite all the
financial hardships, to buy a car on an installment plan to avoid harassment and
guarantee her safety. Similarly, Hend could not give up on her car and endured
its cost of fuel and repairs to avoid repeating the experiences where she was
harassed on public transportation. In fact, all participants except for Salma and
Esraa stated that they feel safer driving and avoid public transportation. While
Salma and Esraa did not drive, they still paid much money for cabs and private
transportation. Such pricy options extend to the places available to socialize, as
all ten women stated that they had to go to relatively expensive places to avoid
harassment, unlike their male counterparts who had the option of going to
cheaper public cafés and street venues. This notion comes in line with the
literature on the public space available for middle classes women in Egypt,
where many limitations and added costs are placed upon women (de Konning,
2009; Roque, 2020).
Financial hardships have also played a role in limiting women’s ability
to socialize. In Esraa’s case, who was relatively capable of maintaining much
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of her lifestyle after the economic measures were put in place, she found it hard
to socialize with her friends who had more responsibilities to attend to. And she
found it very depressing and mentally draining to endure the state of panic that
was happening then. Laila was one of those burdened and incapable of meeting
up with friends, as she could not afford to socialize because her financial
situation got dire. She avoided going out with friends because she could not
afford to eat out. She also avoided other social occasions like marriages and
birthdays as she did not have the budget for a gift or proper outfit. Mariana also
finds it intimidating to go out to certain places because she does not want to be
judged for considering those places pricy. Generally, all participants stated that
they stopped going out, visiting places, and eating out as part of cutting costs to
afford the rising cost of living. Given the limitations on women’s access to
cheaper venues, like public cafes and street stalls, their ability to maintain social
relations and space minimizes.
Added Worker Effect
The double burden or added worker effect has been significant for all
the participants, as all of them kept taking over the bigger share of household
chores and responsibilities, and sometimes with no help at all. Even when a
division of labor was agreed upon, women still had to pick up what men gave
up on. An example is Gameela’s agreement with her husband to help their
daughter with part of her homework that was breached, and she had to take over.
Mayar as well stated that her husband is not aware of any of the household work
because he simply comes home to sit and relax. Same for Salma’s husband, who
comes home just to be served food and relax. While Gameela, Mayar, and Sarah
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found it an unequal division of labor and exhausting to endure, Esraa and
Mariana did not seem to be much bothered by taking the bigger share of house
chores simply because they did not see it much work given the size of their
families. This notion of double burden has been evident in all the literature on
women under austerity, especially that of the 2008 financial crisis, as explained
earlier in the literature review (Griffin, 2015; Périvier, 2016; Perrons, 2017).
To sum up, while the financial need necessitates women’s financial
contribution to their households, it does not much reflect on their ability to
exercise social freedoms. The worse the economic situation gets, the more
women are required to contribute by finances or by cutting off expenses and
doing more chores, creating a double burden that all participants suffer from.
This eats up women’s time to contemplate or do activities they enjoy or even
learn something new. And as the places where it is socially acceptable for
women to socialize get more expensive, there is less opportunity for them to
maintain relationships, unlike men who have more space in the social realm.
Female-headed VS Co-headed households
Comparing female-headed to co-headed households, it is evident
through this research that women in the female-headed households exercised
more financial empowerment and were less vulnerable to elements of
disempowerment. Still, they suffered more of the added worker effect, social
limitations, and time poverty.
The absence of a partner or a male supporter made women more
appreciative of their financial capabilities and contributions. Laila was the most
significant case, being a single mother who takes full responsibility for her
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daughters with no contribution from the father. She stated that her financial role
is most significant in the household and that she is in full charge of the decisionmaking dynamics simply because no one else will do it. Radwa is yet another
case; given her father’s disability, he cannot contribute to the household income
anymore, which leaves her and her sister as the breadwinners. She sounded
more confident and affirmative about the value of her direct financial
contribution as well as the housekeeping she does to save more money. She
bluntly stated that she is less inclined toward the commitment of marriage,
knowing that she will not find enough appreciation and understanding of her
efforts. In a similar context, Hend was keen on maintaining control over her
finances and not asking for family help or support unless absolutely necessary.
She stated that she would rather give up on necessities like postponing a medical
appointment than ask her mother for money, all to self-acknowledge her control
over finances. Similar attitudes could be traced in co-headed households where
the partner was unavailable. Sarah and Mayar had a bigger share of making
decisions simply because their husbands had to dedicate more time to their jobs
and chose to give up part of their say to their wives.
While women in the female-headed household were not socially
disempowered due to the patriarchal pattern of decision-making and the
domestic division of labor, they were equally suffering from the added worker
effect and limitations in the public spaces. In fact, the element that affected
social empowerment the most was that of having children. Laila’s capacity to
exercise social empowerment was much less in comparison to Hend and Radwa.
While the latter two could maintain friendships, socialize and gather even in
relatively cheaper places or in friends’ houses, Laila did not have much time to
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socialize after taking over extra freelance work and not affording social
obligations of gift exchange or paying a bill at a café.
Perception of Empowerment
It has been evident through this research that women’s situation,
whether empowered or not, is not necessarily directly related to how they
actually feel it. In some instances, women did not feel empowered at all despite
exercising much independence and control over their finances and choices.
Each had reasons for lacking the feeling, some due to the pressure of social
norms and traditional family dynamics, and some due to the uncertainty brought
by the economic hardships. Gameela enjoys several empowering traits; she has
a stable job, has full control over her salary, chooses to finance the school fees
of her second daughter, and exercises an equal share of control over her
household decisions and finances. Still, she feels disempowered because she has
to fight and overachieve at work to prove herself an equal to her male
counterparts, that she does the bigger share of chores and household
responsibilities at home, and the fact that the husband has “veto power over all
decisions” does not feel empowering even if he doesn’t use it. Mariana does not
share any of Gameela’s concerns and enjoys all of the empowering traits; she
feels this empowerment is totally compromised by the economic uncertainty
that makes her “extremely scared of what the future might bring”, and considers
the middle classes to which she belongs a victim to the economic policies. While
Sarah has the upper hand in her household decisions and could secure a source
of income, she still feels disempowered due to the increasing financial burdens
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and the effort it takes to keep her household going, as well as her aspirations
that she feels unfulfilled due to her social and familial duties and circumstances.
On the other hand, Salma did not have many of the empowering traits,
yet she seemed very content and confident that she was fully empowered
because she earned an income - even if little - and chose to spend it on her
household, capable of maintaining relationships and has equal space to men at
work. She did not seem much concerned about the patriarchal family dynamics
and found that the double burden is simply part of her duty as a wife and a
mother. Similarly, for Heba, she finds that the mere ability to maintain a job and
have an income is empowering, even if this income is barely sufficient to cover
her household expenses paycheck to paycheck. Other trivial traits were
associated with Esraa’s sense of empowerment, like the ability to afford taking
a taxi with her own money or buying herself coffee and a nice meal.
While all participants were aware of the role social stand plays in their
sense of empowerment and providing privilege, some felt it is equally
burdening. Heba felt it is empowering and protective of belonging to her stand
and considers association with her workplace a pillar of prestige, hence social
empowerment. Mariana as well finds it empowering to be acquainted with
people who would help her against deceit and being taken advantage of. Yet,
for Hend, having to answer to stand and Party is exhausting and compromises
her sense of empowerment, and she feels empowered when capable of
performing some act of rebellion, like traveling against her brother’s will. But
still, she could not give up on the privileges that her stand brings, like moving
to a cheaper neighborhood or changing her consumption habits. Likewise,
Mayar did not feel socially empowered until she could break away from the
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elements of stand and party, and she gives an example of how empowering it
felt that she renewed her driving license without the need for a favor. Still, she
felt it is important to maintain a lifestyle that makes her equal to her peers, like
sending her son to a private school or taking him to a sports club. And while
Laila and Sarah did not give much significance to the effect of stand and party
over their sense of empowerment, they still were aware of the role that stand
played as a support system and source of favors and privilege.
Building on that point of Stand, participants felt they are required to
extend empowerment to other women in other social groups. For instance,
Hend, Laila, and Salma believed that their inability to use more of the help of
cleaning ladies who come from poorer classes compromises the financial
empowerment of those women and passes on the economic toll to them. This
notion made Hend insist on keeping the same level of help at the expense of
other personal priorities. Mayar, however, feels that women of poorer classes
have become much more aware of their rights and feels it is a duty to help them
to know more about their prospects and opportunities. Even within the middle
classes, Heba feels it is her duty to make women in her community aware of the
need to keep an income or some savings for themselves and to seek any kind of
job. In short, women consider it is empowering to act in solidarity and help
empower other women.
To sum up, while women enjoyed economic empowerment in terms of
having an independent source of income, they were not equally empowered
socially. Patriarchal dynamics in the households affect their share of decisionmaking. The social pressure that places emphasis and judgment on their roles
as housewives and mothers keep them in an inferior placement. While women
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are required to run errands in multiple social spaces (work, school, clubs, etc.),
they do not have equal space to socialize and leisure. Still, a sense of
empowerment is deeply personal and varies according to every woman’s
ambition versus her capacities. Relationship with elements of stand and party is
complicated, as some women are aware of the privilege brought by their stand
and party, while others found it more empowering to break away from this stand
yet incapable of doing so.
Unintended Results
Several findings surfaced during this research, which directly and
indirectly affected perceptions of empowerment. These findings are about the
effect of social mobility, the effect of belonging to different age groups, the toll
brought upon households and women due to covid, uncertainty about the
economic situation, ability to maintain lifestyle (i.e., Stand), and housing
ownership among younger age groups.
Firstly, social mobility directly affected women’s perception of
empowerment. For instance, in the case of Esraa, her sense of empowerment
was maximized by moving from a rural environment to an urban one, breaking
away from the strict traditions, having an income she fully controls and being
equal in her marriage in terms of decision making and financial contribution.
On the other hand, Hend moved from an upper-middle classes to a lower layer
of the middle classes, making her feel vulnerable and less empowered because
she could not maintain the lifestyle/Stand she was used to. And fearful of this
vulnerability, Mariana’s sense of empowerment is compromised as she finds
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herself required to make compromises and adjustments to her lifestyle, unlike
what she was used to.
Secondly, the element of age plays a role in the perception of
empowerment. Older age groups seemed more at peace with making
concessions. Salma asserted that she felt totally empowered, and Laila
repeatedly said that she was privileged compared to women of poorer classes.
Women of younger age groups, on the other hand, were yearning for more and
not giving in to the social norms that were widely accepted by the generation of
their mothers. Gameela, for instance, was proud that she was standing for herself
against sexism in the workplace and that women speak up about issues of
harassment and inequality. Mayar as well found that one of the empowering
perks of her workplace was being managed by women almost exclusively and
that the barrier of culture against women empowerment is being broken.
Thirdly, Covid greatly affected how women perceived and exercised
empowerment, especially those who had children. Aside from the accelerating
economic toll, mothers were required to stay at home and almost sacrifice their
jobs when schools were closed as part of the measures to control the pandemic,
while fathers were not asked to. Gameela had her salary negotiated because, as
a mother, she is expected to stay at home more with the kids. Heba had to take
unpaid leave to stay with her son at home, which almost cost her the job she
had, let alone a delayed promotion due to her maternity leave. Sarah was lucky
enough to work as a teacher, so she stayed home with her son. And Mayar was
lucky to have a children’s room available at work to place her son in it.
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Fourthly, uncertainty about the economic situation and vulnerability to
slide down in the social stratification affected the participants’ behavior in many
aspects. All participants made adjustments to their lifestyle, sacrificing
activities labeled as luxury or entertainment. They also changed their consumer
behavior by substituting products and brands. Heba and Hend recently forced
themselves to make any kind of savings at the expense of basic needs
sometimes, fearing what the future might bring. Mariana and Esraa are hesitant
to have children because they are not sure they will afford to provide for them.
Radwa refuses the prospects of marriage altogether, is fearful of losing her
control over her finances and time, and refuses the idea of having children in
such economic circumstances. Similarly, Sarah, Mayar, and Heba avoid having
a second child as they can barely provide for the ones they have.
Fifthly Maintaining the lifestyle (i.e., stand) was proven to be of utmost
importance, especially for those who have children, whereas the literature stated
earlier, women are keen on passing privilege to their children. Mayar, for
instance, finds it important to send her child to a relatively expensive school and
takes a loan to buy a car, while the family does not own a place to live and keeps
paying rent. Hend as well made compromises with her medicine or medical
appointment but could not shift to buying cheaper clothing or using public
transportation. And Sarah, despite the debts and loss of assets, is still keen on
sending her son to a relatively expensive private school and reputable social and
sports club.
Lastly, there is an obvious problem with home ownership for the age
group of the mid to late thirties. Mayar, Heba, and Radwa live in rented
properties, incapable of moving due to high rent prices despite their wish to do
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so. Gameela, Mariana, and Hend live in apartments owned by their parents or
in-laws. Esraa and Laila could only buy small places in overpopulated areas.
Sarah lives in a place bought through installments from her husband’s work.
Only Salma lives in an owned suitable housing.
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Conclusion

To conclude, as hypothesized, participants were proven to be financially
empowered under the economic measures imposed by austerity in terms of
access to jobs, sources of income, and having control over their own finances.
Yet, unlike the hypothesis, women were not found to be equally empowered
socially since the social norms, and household dynamics did not change much
under the new circumstances. The need for women’s financial contribution has
become greater than before the measures to maintain the household expenses
and the family's lifestyle, sometimes even without men noticing or knowing
about it. However, this financial role played by women extended beyond direct
funds into the management of household finances. Women have to do more
economical shopping, substitute products, and make sacrifices in household
expenses. All participants took over more house chores and duties to save
money instead of using domestic help.
These efforts were not proven to be proportional to women’s share in
household decision-making. Roles remained unchanged in this regard in a
classic case of double burden. Households where women had an equal or bigger
share of decision-making remained unchanged, even when men paid for the
bigger share of the household expenses. In households where women had to
start working or made a bigger financial contribution, their share of say in
decision-making did not equally increase. Additionally, the increasing financial
role of women was not acknowledged within the household and did not trigger
any change in the division of labor when it came to chores and responsibilities.
The disproportionate magnitude of social and economic empowerment is
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mainly due to the social norms and culture that emphasize women’s obligation
to their households and supports men’s upper hand in the family. This situation
resulted in an added worker effect, extreme time poverty, and mental burnout
among women, especially in households with kids. Consequently, women have
less time and capacity to relax and maintain social relationships.
Women are still faced with challenges in their workplace, especially in
professions conventionally dominated by men, like engineering. The situation
is better with professions that are traditionally occupied by women, like
teaching and administrative work. Other challenges are related to the limited
public space available to women compared to men, which compromises
women’s chances for cheaper entertainment alternatives. Participants agreed
that there is no absolute freedom of mobility and that they are bound to certain
places labeled as safe or mainly occupied by women.
Elements of stand and party play a complicated role when it comes to
empowerment. As much as they provide a haven and support to some women,
others find it intimidating to have to conform to a certain lifestyle to remain
included in their social group. Although some find it liberating to break away
from this element of Stand, they are not capable of fully doing so.
Lastly, a woman’s sense of empowerment does not necessarily correlate
to measures or indicators. Rather, it is completely personal and depends on their
aspirations and capabilities. A woman may exercise a great deal of economic
empowerment yet still feels disempowered. Another might be less empowered
but, in fact, feels much more empowered.
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Appendix
Appendix I: About the Participants
Esraa: A middle-class journalist in her late thirties, married with no children.
She comes from a family who lived in a village in Sharkeya, and her mother
was a housewife who did not have a university degree. She had a degree in
English literature, moved to Cairo, and worked in customer service before
finding her way to journalism in 2011. She got married in 2017 to a journalist
who shifted his career to be a fitness coach. They split all marriage expenses
and even bought their apartment together. They moved to the UK in January
2021, and they are expecting their first child.

Gameela: An upper-middle class construction engineer in her mid-30s. She
comes from a family of professionals in Mansoura in the north of Egypt, got her
university education in Cairo, married, and settled there. She has two girls; one
is nine years, and the other is four years old. She had a career break for five
years, through which she had her second child and finished her Ph.D. She had
to go back to work in November 2021 due to the need for her income.

Heba: A middle-class banker in Banque Misr who lives in Sharm El-Sheikh, is

married, and has a son. Her husband worked in electronics sales as an office
manager for B-tech in Sharm El-Sheikh. Her household has been through a
difficult time after enforcing the austerity then Corona, as her husband’s salary
shrunk due to the lack of sales until he lost his job in 2020. He stayed at home
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for 4-6 months, and the positions he found later did not generate the same
income level.

Hend: A middle-class lawyer in her mid-thirties who lives in Cairo but comes
originally from upper Egypt. She graduated with a degree in physics, then
worked for a women’s advocacy organization and studied for a law degree.
She’s divorced, with no children, and lives in her mother’s apartment in
Heliopolis. Her current lifestyle is a downgrade from an upper-middle-class to
a relatively lower/typical middle class.

Laila: A lower-middle class single mother in her late 40s, divorced with two
daughters, ages 16 and 14. She has been supporting her daughters for more than
ten years now. The toll of economic measures was so hard on her that she had
to find a job in the gulf in 2020 to continue supporting her daughters. She moved
to the US one year later and managed to have the girls with her, hoping she
could grant them a future in this new land.

Mariana: An upper-middle class journalist in her early thirties. She got married
two years ago and lives in Heliopolis, where her parents and in-laws also live.
Her husband works in photography and media production, and they have no
children.
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Mayar: An upper-middle class communications professional. Is in her early
thirties, married, and has a kid. She used to do freelance work for a long time
before settling for a permanent job at Save the Children in September 2019. She
had to find a better-paid and more stable position as her son got older and needed
more financial support. She comes from a middle-class family, where the
mother is a housewife, and the family is protective of the girls.

Radwa: A lower-middle class fresh graduate. She is single and in her midtwenties. She lives with her father and sister, and her mother died ten years ago.
She has a law degree and currently studying for a postgraduate diploma. She
worked at an early age while studying for her undergraduate degree as an
assistant teacher. She teaches private lessons to get some extra income. She
worked for multiple places on a temporary and fixed-term basis. Her father had
an accident that left him disabled, making her and her sister the main providers
for the household.

Salma: A middle-class former high-school teacher who shifted to education
management. She’s in her early fifties, a mother of three university students.
Her family is split between Cairo and Kafr Elsheikh. Her husband works in
agricultural research.
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Sarah: An upper-middle class teacher. She is in her late thirties, from a middleclass family in upper Egypt, married with one child, and lives in Alexandria
since 2008. She has a degree in business and worked for a while in her early
career as a market analyst but stayed home after getting married. In 2018, she
had to take a job as a school teacher to support herself and contribute to her
family’s finances.
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Appendix II: Interview Questions
Group 1: Demographic and General Questions
Where do you live?
How big is your family?
Who is the main provider?
What do you think happened to the Egyptian economy after 2016?
What was the initial effect of the new measures on your household?
Did you move houses during this time?
What qualifications do you have?
Do you find it easy to acquire skills/credentials that you need to better position
yourself in the job market?
How empowered do you think you are (financially and socially)?

Group 2: Questions Related to Economic Empowerment
How was your family income affected after 2016?
What are the main expenses of your household?
Do you try to generate income for the household?
Did you sell any assets after 2016?
How easy was it to try and find a job or any income-generating activity?
What is the scope and capacity of your involvement in your family’s financial
decisions?
Are you able to make any savings or buy any assets for yourself?
How much control do you think you have over financial resources?
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Group 3: Questions related to Social Empowerment
Did you have to make any changes to your lifestyle after 2016?
Describe your daily routine.
How involved is your husband in the household work/chores? (did it change
over the past four years)?
How much say do you have in family decisions?
How fair is the division of responsibilities with your partner?
How much time do you have for yourself/your pursuits?
How free to move around do you think you are? (Ability to go to places for
professional/family/personal errands)
How judgmental do you find people in your community?
How understanding do you find your community to the responsibilities you
have?
How often do you feel overwhelmed/tired/burdened?
Do you think you have the same social space as men in your community?
Do you think you have the social position you need or find sufficient for your
pursuits?
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Appendix III: Coding Sheet 1
Economic Empowerment

Social Empowerment

Freedom of Mobility

Employment/ Control
over
Source of
income
income

Independent
Personal
Financial
Decisions

Equal Say in
Family Decisions

Selfdevelopment

Social Life

Family
Limits

Safety

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Gameela Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Heba

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Hend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Laila

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Mariana Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Mayar

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Radwa

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Salma

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Sarah

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Esraa

Concerns

Financial
limits
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Appendix III: Coding Sheet 2
Acknowledging
Financial Role
By
Self

By
Family

Time Poverty

Feels Empowered

Able to Maintain
Lifestyle

Financial Security

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Gameela No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Heba

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Hend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Laila

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Mariana No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Mayar

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Radwa

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Salma

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Sarah

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Esraa

Social Norms/ Pressure/
Judgment
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